Imapizza v At Pizza Ltd by District Court of District of Columbia
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
____________________________________ 
      ) 
IMAPIZZA, LLC,    ) 
      ) 
   Plaintiff,  ) 
      )  
v.      )   Case No. 17-cv-2327 (TJK/GMH) 
       ) 
AT PIZZA LIMITED, et al,   ) 
      ) 




REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION  
 
In this case, Plaintiff IMAPizza, LLC, a restaurant chain based in Washington, D.C., filed 
a complaint alleging that Defendants—At Pizza, Ltd., a Scottish restaurant, and Bhasker Dhir and 
Rupert Lyle, At Pizza’s owners and directors—infringed on Plaintiff’s copyrights and trademarks 
in the United Kingdom, committed trespass under District of Columbia law, and committed the 
tort of “passing-off” under the common law of the United Kingdom.  Defendants succeeded in 
having the federal and District of Columbia claims dismissed, and Judge Kelly ordered Plaintiff to 
produce evidence to prove diversity jurisdiction over the remaining tort claim of passing-off.  
When Plaintiff failed to submit such evidence, the Court dismissed that claim as well.  Plaintiff 
appealed Judge Kelly’s orders and the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims.  
Defendants then filed the instant motion for attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, the Copyright 
Act, the Lanham Act, and Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seeking $463,000.12 in 
attorney’s fees and costs.  Judge Kelly referred the motion to the undersigned for a Report and 
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Recommendation.  After reviewing the entire record, the undersigned recommends awarding 
Defendants attorney’s fees in the amount of $201,670.66.1 
I. BACKGROUND 
Judge Kelly’s opinion dismissing Plaintiff’s federal and District of Columbia claims ably 
sets out the relevant factual background of this case, IMAPizza, LLC v. At Pizza Ltd., 334 F. Supp. 
3d 95, 105–106 (D.D.C. 2018), as does the D.C. Circuit’s decision affirming that dismissal, 
IMAPizza LLC v. At Pizza Ltd., 965 F.3d 871 (D.C. Cir. 2020).  This section therefore borrows 
heavily from those narratives. 
Plaintiff operates a restaurant chain called &pizza, a trademarked name, in the District of 
Columbia and other locations in the Eastern United States.  ECF No. 1 at. 2–3.  According to 
Plaintiff, its &pizza business has certain distinctive features, such as “an elongated oval skinny 
pizza design,” “elongated rectangular skinny boxes,” “slogans that include ‘LOVE&pizza’ and 
‘YOU&pizza,’” and employees that are referred to as its “Tribe.”  Id. at 3–4.  Plaintiff also 
submitted copyright applications for the “architectural and interior design plans” of its restaurants, 
“including the layout, and look and feel of its locations.”  Id. at 9.   
Defendants Lyle and Dhir reside in, and are citizens of, the United Kingdom and operate a 
pizza restaurant, called @pizza,2 in Scotland.  Id. at 2–3.  According to Plaintiff, after “tour[ing] a 
number of &pizza locations in Washington, D.C.,” Defendants Lyle and Dhir allegedly 
“[r]ealiz[ed] the uniqueness of &pizza’s restaurant chain” and decided to copy it.  Id. at 4–5.  In 
October 2015, Defendant Lyle incorporated a private limited company called “& Pizza Limited” 
                                                          
1 The following docket entries are relevant to the resolution of this dispute: (1) Defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees 
and exhibits (ECF No 62 through 62-34); (2) Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees and 
exhibits (ECF No. 63 through 63-5); (3) Defendants’ reply in support of their motion for attorney’s fees and exhibits 
(ECF No. 64 through 64-11).  The page numbers cited herein are those assigned by the Court’s CM/ECF system. 
2 This Report and Recommendation uses “At Pizza” to refer to the defendant in this case, the private limited company 
(ECF No. 1 at 2), and uses “@pizza” to refer to Defendants’ restaurant in Scotland (ECF No. 1 at 5). 
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under the laws of the United Kingdom, later renaming the business “At Pizza.”  ECF No. 23 at 
11–12.  Plaintiff also claimed that Defendants Lyle and Dhir “entered into &pizza’s Washington, 
D.C. locations masquerading as customers, took extensive pictures (not identifying themselves as 
the competition), accessed all parts of the restaurant that they could to observe its design, and 
returned to Scotland with this copyrighted information.”  ECF No. 1 at 6–7.  Defendants, of course, 
disagree with that characterization of their visits to &pizza restaurants.  Defendant Lyle contends 
that he has visited an &pizza restaurant only once and it was by happenstance during a family 
vacation in July 2015 (ECF No. 20 at 2) and Defendant Dhir states that, although he did visit the 
United States as part of his research for opening @pizza, he visited many different pizza 
restaurants during the trip and was not fixated on &pizza (ECF No. 19 at 3–4).  According to the 
Complaint, in addition to visiting &pizza restaurants, Defendants downloaded photographs of 
&pizza restaurants from websites operating on servers located in the United States, including 
“yelp.com” and “flydulles.com.”  ECF No. 1 at 9–10.  Plaintiff claims that is owns the copyrights 
to at least three of the downloaded photographs.  Id.   
In November 2017, Defendants opened a single @pizza restaurant in Edinburgh, Scotland.3  
Id. at 2, 4–5.  Plaintiff contends that the @pizza restaurant has many of the same distinctive 
features as Plaintiff’s &pizza restaurants.  For example, @pizza uses oval shaped pizza, elongated 
pizza boxes, slogans including “LOVE@pizza” and “YOU@pizza,” and promotion of its staff as 
“the Squad” and “the Pack.”  Id. at 5–6.  In addition, Plaintiff claims that @pizza has a similar 
architectural design as &pizza, that Defendants’ name “@pizza” is extremely similar to Plaintiff’s 
trademarked name “&pizza,” and that Defendants used three copyrighted photographs of &pizza 
for marketing.  Id. at 5–9.  After learning of Defendants’ allegedly copycat restaurant, Plaintiff 
                                                          
3 Since this case began, Defendants have opened two additional @pizza restaurants in the U.K.  See Locations, @pizza, 
https://www.atpizza.com/ (last visited June 3, 2021). 
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sent a cease and desist letter.  Id. at 8.  Defendants apparently refused to cooperate and instead 
responded that they “would be personally escorting their general manager to Washington, D.C. so 
he or she could also carefully observe &pizza’s design, operation and marketing.”  Id. at 8–9. 
Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court on November 3, 2017 bringing five causes of action 
alleging that (1) Defendants violated the Copyright Act by “infring[ing] [Plaintiff’s] copyrights in 
the architectural works and three photographs mentioned above”; (2) Defendants violated the U.K. 
common law tort of passing-off4 by “improperly trad[ing] on the goodwill associated with 
[Plaintiff’s] distinctive trademark and other features, thereby harming [Plaintiff]”; (3) Defendants 
violated the Lanham Act by infringing on Plaintiff’s “&pizza” trademark; (4) Defendants violated 
the Lanham Act by committing acts of unfair competition; and (5) “Defendants committed trespass 
under District of Columbia law when they entered &pizza restaurants without permission for the 
purpose of stealing [Plaintiff’s] intellectual property.”  IMAPizza, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 107.  But 
Plaintiff brought their suit in the wrong forum, attempting to apply United States law to allegedly 
infringing conduct that occurred entirely within the United Kingdom.  As both Judge Kelly and 
the D.C. Circuit recognized, it is well established that United States copyright and trademark law 
cannot apply to conduct overseas absent some act of domestic infringement or some effect on 
United States commerce.  IMAPizza, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 116–17, 121–22; IMAPizza, 965 F.3d at 
876, 879–80.  Plaintiff argued that extraterritorial application of copyright law was appropriate 
because Defendants had visited Plaintiff’s restaurants in the United States, taken photographs of 
Plaintiff’s restaurants in the United States, and downloaded photographs of Plaintiff’s restaurants 
from U.S. servers.  IMAPizza, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 118–19.  Plaintiff also argued that extraterritorial 
                                                          
4 Passing-off under U.K. law may be used to prevent an individual or entity from “passing-off” their own goods as 
those of another, in turn capitalizing on the other individual’s or entity’s goodwill in the market.  See Starbucks (HK) 
Ltd. v. British Sky Broadcasting Group PLC at 5 (2015) (U.K. Sup. Ct. 31). 
Case 1:17-cv-02327-TJK-GMH   Document 65   Filed 06/08/21   Page 4 of 57
5 
application of trademark law was appropriate because American students visit Scotland and may 
be confused by the similarities between the two restaurants and one potential business partner of 
Defendants was confused by the similarity between the two restaurants.  Id. at 123.  Judge Kelly 
and the D.C. Circuit firmly rejected each argument.   
In granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Copyright Act claim, Judge Kelly 
concluded that Plaintiff’s theories for extraterritorial application of U.S. copyright law were 
“meritless” and “ma[d]e no sense” because Plaintiff had failed to allege any actions that could 
“plausibly constitute[ ] infringement within the United States.”  IMAPizza, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 118–
19.  He explained that Plaintiff cited no case suggesting that accessing copyrighted work alone—
that is, visiting Plaintiff’s restaurants—could constitute infringement and that taking photographs 
of an architectural work cannot, as a matter of law constitute infringement, “if the building in 
which the work is embodied is located in or ordinarily visible from a public place.”  Id. (quoting 
17 U.S.C. § 120(a)).  In rejecting Plaintiff’s theory that downloads from U.S. servers constitute 
domestic infringement, Judge Kelly explained that it “[was] not hard to” conclude that 
downloading a photograph creates a “copy” “where the receiving computer assembles the 
[downloaded] information,” not where the image is initially hosted.  Id. at 119–20.  Thus, 
downloading a photograph to a computer in the United Kingdom could not constitute domestic 
infringement.  Id.  In dismissing Plaintiff’s trademark claims, Judge Kelly found that Plaintiff’s 
theories were speculative, at best, and that Plaintiff “provide[d] no concrete facts suggesting an 
effect on U.S. commerce, only supposition drawn from the unremarkable fact that U.S. tourists 
and university students . . . visit[ ] Edinburgh, Scotland.”  Id. at 123.  Judge Kelly explained that 
“Defendants’ ‘operations and their effects’ [were] entirely ‘confined within the limits of a foreign 
nation[,]’” that Plaintiff had failed to make any “allegation that Defendants [had] made any 
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purchases of supplies or sales of pizza in the United States, or even that their products or 
advertisements [had] entered the United States through the stream of commerce[;]” thus, Plaintiffs 
had failed allege any plausible effect on United States commerce, as is required for extraterritorial 
application of the Lanham Act.  Id. at 121–22 (quoting Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 
286 (1952)).   
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit agreed with Judge Kelly.  The Court of Appeals rejected 
Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants committed domestic copyright infringement by downloading 
photographs hosted on U.S. servers, noting that Plaintiff “provide[d] no technical, legal, or other 
support [ ] for the proposition that downloading a picture from a server located in the U.S. creates 
a copy of that picture in the U.S. in addition to the copy where the receiving device is located.”  
IMAPizza, 965 F.3d at 877–78.  The Court of Appeals also rejected Plaintiff’s argument that 
Defendants committed domestic copyright infringement by taking photographs of its restaurants, 
agreeing with Judge Kelly that that argument failed as a matter of law “because the Copyright Act 
does not create a right to prevent the taking of pictures of an architectural work ‘if the building in 
which the work is embodied is located in or ordinarily visible from a public place.’”  Id. at 878 
(quoting 17 U.S.C. § 120(a)).  Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that Plaintiff failed to “allege 
any act of copyright infringement in the United States.”  Id.  With respect to Plaintiff’s trademark 
infringement arguments, the Court of Appeals firmly rejected each of Plaintiff’s theories of some 
effect on U.S. commerce.  Id. at 880–81.  The D.C. Circuit explained that “to apply the Lanham 
Act based upon U.S. students and tourists buying food while in Edinburgh would . . . ‘extend [the 
Act] to all commercial conduct occurring anywhere in the world that American tourists visit in 
significant numbers,’” and that Plaintiff’s other theories failed to establish the type of “domestic 
reputational harm” necessary to apply the Lanham Act.  Id. at 880 (second alteration in original) 
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(quoting IMAPizza, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 123).  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded that 
Plaintiff “failed to allege some plausible effect—let alone a significant or substantial effect—upon 
U.S. commerce.”  Id. at 881. 
Following the D.C. Circuit’s decision, Defendants filed the instant motion for attorney’s 
fees.5  ECF No. 62.  Briefing was complete on November 30, 2020, and Defendants’ motion is 
currently ripe for resolution. 
II. DISCUSSION 
For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends awarding Defendants 
$201,670.66 in attorney’s fees.  Defendants are not entitled to recover costs incurred on appeal or 
attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 or Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 
however, they are entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees under both the Copyright Act and 
the Lanham Act.  Defendants are also entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees for time spent 
briefing the successful parts of their November 2018 motion for attorney’s fees.  Having reviewed 
Defendants’ fee petition, the undersigned finds that an award of $201,670.66 appropriately 
compensates Defendants in proportion to the claims for which they are entitled to recover 
attorney’s fees.   
A. 28 U.S.C. 1927 
Defendants first seek a fee award pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927.  Under that statute, a court 
may award attorney’s fees against an attorney who “multiplies the proceedings in any case 
unreasonably and vexatiously.”  28 U.S.C. § 1927.  To justify such an award, an attorney’s conduct 
                                                          
5 Defendants filed a nearly identical motion for attorney’s fees on November 6, 2018.  ECF No. 48.  That motion was 
fully briefed by November 27, 2018 (ECF No. 51); however, due to the pending appeal, Judge Kelly stayed the district 
court proceedings pending resolution of Plaintiff’s appeal (Minute Order dated July 19, 2019).  Following resolution 
of Plaintiff’s appeal, Judge Kelly lifted the stay, denied without prejudice Defendants’ then-pending motion for 
attorney’s fees, and directed the parties to attempt to reach an agreement on the fee issue.  Minute Order dated Sept. 
10, 2020.  The parties were unable to reach an agreement (ECF No. 61) and Defendants filed the instant motion for 
attorney’s fees on October 30, 2020 (ECF No. 62). 
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must show “evidence of recklessness, bad faith, or improper motive” in filings or proceedings that 
are deemed to be unreasonable and vexatious.  LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 146 F.3d 899, 
906 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Travelers Ins. v. St. Jude Hosp. of Kenner, La., Inc., 38 F.3d 1414, 
1416–17 (5th Cir. 1994)).  Thus, courts use section 1927 to sanction attorneys who abuse the 
judicial process with “repeated or singularly egregious” misbehavior.  United States v. Wallace, 
964 F.2d 1214, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
Defendants argue that fees are warranted under section 1927 because (1) Plaintiff 
recklessly pursued its Lanham Act claim, despite admitting that there is no risk of confusion 
between the “@pizza” and “&pizza” trademarks, (2) Plaintiff’s Copyright Act, trespass, and 
passing-off claims were frivolous, and (3) Plaintiff unreasonably prolonged litigation by forcing 
Defendants to mediate and by requesting multiple, unwarranted extensions of time.  ECF No. 62-
1 at 21–25.  None of those contentions demonstrate the type of repeated misbehavior or singularly 
egregious misconduct necessary to justify fees under section 1927. 
Defendants first argue that Plaintiff recklessly pursued its Lanham Act claim before the 
Court because Plaintiff “abandoned its primary basis for bringing suit.”  ECF No. 62-1 at 22.  In 
support, Defendants point to Plaintiff’s allegedly inconsistent arguments regarding the likelihood 
of confusion between the names “&pizza” and “@pizza” in proceedings before the United 
Kingdom Intellectual Property Office (“UKIPO”) and this Court.6  Id. at 22–23.  Defendants claim 
that Plaintiff “admitted” before the UKIPO that there was no likelihood of confusion between the 
two trademarks and thus had no basis for pursuing its Lanham Act claim before this Court.  Id.  
Defendants’ argument is unavailing.  Defendants have cited nothing to suggest that the U.K. law 
                                                          
6 “The Lanham Act protects trademarks against their ‘use in commerce . . . likely to cause confusion,’ and reaches ‘all 
commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.’”  IMAPizza, LLC, v. At Pizza, 965 F.3d 871, 879 (D.C. Cir. 
2020) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a), 1127). 
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governing what constitutes “a likelihood of confusion” is the same as the Lanham Act standard 
that governs in the United States.  Indeed, as Plaintiff points out, “[w]hen [trademark] rights within 
the United States are being litigated in an American court, the decisions of foreign courts 
concerning the respective [trademark] rights of the parties are irrelevant. . . .”   ECF No. 63 at 22 
(quoting Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591, 599-600 (5th 
Cir. 1985)).  Given that Plaintiff’s arguments regarding likelihood of confusion occurred in two 
different proceedings, governed by the laws of two different countries, the undersigned cannot 
conclude that Plaintiff did in fact take inconsistent positions and thus Defendants have not shown 
that Plaintiff “recklessly pursued” its Lanham Act claim in violation of section 1927. 
 Defendants next argue that Plaintiff unreasonably prolonged the litigation by pursuing its 
Copyright Act, trespass, and passing-off claims because those claims had no merit.  ECF No. 62-
1 at 23–24.  With respect to Plaintiff’s copyright claim, Defendants argue that the claim was 
“suspect” from the start but that, at a minimum, it should have been withdrawn following the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Fourth Estate Public Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, __ U.S. __, 139 
S. Ct. 881 (2019), which was decided when this case was on appeal and which Defendants argue 
foreclosed any chance of success for Plaintiff’s copyright claim.7  ECF No. 62-1 at 24; ECF No. 
63 at 24–25.  This argument is unpersuasive.  As Plaintiff points out, some courts have simply 
dismissed claims foreclosed by Fourth Estate without prejudice, allowing those plaintiffs to refile 
their complaint once the copyright has been registered. ECF No. 63 at 25; see Buchanan v. Sony 
Music Entertainment, No. 18-cv-3028, 2020 WL 2735592, at *5, 9 (D.D.C. May 26, 2020) 
                                                          
7 Fourth Estate held that registration of a copyright, which is required prior to filing suit under the Copyright Act, 
occurs not “as soon as the claimant delivers the required application, copies of the work, and fee to the Copyright 
Office[,]” but “when the Copyright Office [actually] registers a copyright.”  __ U.S. at __, 139 S. Ct. at 886.  Here, 
Plaintiff filed its copyright claim before the Copyright Office had registered the copyright.  ECF 63 at 25. 
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(dismissing without prejudice claims based on copyrights that had not been registered with the 
Copyright Office prior to filing the complaint); Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 18-CV-10956, 
2019 WL 1454317, at *2, 4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2019) (dismissing without prejudice to filing a new 
action a copyright claim premised on an unregistered copyright and noting that Fourth Estate 
explained that registration is “akin to an administrative exhaustion requirement” and that 
“dismissal for failure to exhaust is usually without prejudice”).  So, it is possible that had Plaintiff 
voluntarily dismissed its copyright claim without prejudice, and then filed another complaint, 
litigation in this case would have lasted even longer.  Defendants’ claim that refiling may have 
“affected Plaintiff’s claim to statutory damages” (ECF No. 64 at 11), but they do not elaborate on 
what they mean by that or cite anything to explain how an effect on statutory damages would have 
prevented Plaintiff from refiling or unreasonably prolonged this litigation.  Defendants also claim 
that refiling might have violated Rule 11 given that Plaintiff now knows that Defendants are 
located in the U.K. (id.), but it is not clear that Plaintiff would have refiled an identical complaint, 
based on identical facts.  So, the undersigned cannot assume a refiled copyright claim would 
necessarily have violated Rule 11.   
Even if Plaintiff could not have refiled its complaint, its conduct here still does not rise to 
the level necessary for awarding fees under section 1927 for pursuit of meritless claims.  See 
Robertson v. Cartinhour, 883 F. Supp. 2d 121, 126–29 (D.D.C. 2012) (awarding section 1927 fees 
for continued prosecution of meritless claims where plaintiff filed a second suit, asserting claims 
“flatly inconsistent with” his earlier suit and that were without “basis in law or fact” given a jury 
verdict in his prior case); see also Jolly Grp., Ltd. v. Medline Indus., Inc., 435 F.3d 717, 720–21 
(7th Cir. 2006) (upholding an award of fees where a plaintiff filed an amended complaint, after his 
first complaint was dismissed with prejudice, in “an effort . . . to abandon an unsuccessful legal 
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theory and substitute a new one”); see also Kapco Mfg. Co., Inc. v. C & O Enters., Inc., 886 F.2d 
1485, 1492 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding an award of fees under section 1927 where the plaintiff 
filed a second complaint, after the first complaint was dismissed with prejudice, “for the express 
purpose of avoiding the district court’s order and shopping for a different forum”); cf. Hall v. DHS, 
219 F. Supp. 3d 112, 120 (D.D.C. 2016) (awarding section 1927 fees where party’s filings “did 
not merely seek the advancement of meritless positions, but they were also composed of largely 
irrelevant diatribes against [the other party] that ‘utterly’ lacked any ‘colorable basis’” (quoting 
Patton Boggs, LLP v. Chevron Corp., 825 F. Supp. 2d 35, 42 (D.D.C. 2011))).   
As for the trespass and passing-off claims, Defendants do not elaborate on what made those 
claims meritless aside from pointing to their successful motion to dismiss and emails they sent to 
Plaintiff’s counsel informing them that the claims were frivolous.  ECF No. 62-1 at 23–24.  
Without more, Defendants have shown neither repeated misbehavior by Plaintiff’s counsel nor 
singularly egregious misconduct rising to the level of recklessness or bad faith that would warrant 
awarding attorney’s fees under section 1927.  See, e.g., Patton Boggs, 825 F. Supp. 2d at 42  
(denying attorney’s fees under section 1927 after dismissing complaint for failure to state a claim 
and recognizing that “the imposition of fees and costs under [section] 1927 is extremely high”); 
Kassatly v. Dynaco Acquisition Corp., No. 96-2419, 1997 WL 31104, *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 1997) 
(noting that “[t]he advancement of meritless positions … unless it is utterly without colorable 
basis, will not support a finding of bad faith”); cf. LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody & Co., Inc., 146 
F.3d 899, 905–06 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (awarding attorney’s fees against a law firm that used an 
unknowing state court to obtain an ex parte order staying arbitration ordered by a federal court); 
Fritz v. Honda Motor Co., 818 F.2d 924, 925–26 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (awarding attorney’s fees against 
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a lawyer who “repeatedly took actions which required [the defendant] to expend unnecessary time 
and money, even though he had no intention of pursuing this litigation”).  
Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s counsel unreasonably prolonged this litigation by 
requesting multiple, unwarranted extensions of time throughout the proceedings.8  ECF No. 62-1 
at 25.  The record reflects that Plaintiff’s counsel sought four extensions of time while the case 
was on appeal and requested to reschedule the oral argument date.  See Motion to Extend Time to 
File Brief, IMAPizza, 965 F.3d 871 (No. 18-7168), Motion to Suspend Briefing or Extend Time to 
File Brief, IMAPizza, 965 F.3d 871 (No. 18-7168), Motion to Suspend Briefing Schedule or to 
Extend Time to File Brief, IMAPizza, 965 F.3d 871 (No. 18-7168), Motion to Extend Time to File 
Response, IMAPizza, 965 F.3d 871 (No. 18-7168), Motion to Reschedule Oral Argument, 
IMAPizza, 965 F.3d 871 (No. 18-7168).  Review of those requests shows that Plaintiff’s counsel 
sought extensions because the parties were attempting to settle the case, because Defendants’ 
November 2018 fee motion was pending before the district court and Plaintiff’s counsel believed 
that any appeal from a decision on the fee motion should be consolidated with the substantive 
appeal, because Plaintiff’s counsel needed additional time, and because Plaintiff’s lead counsel 
had preplanned vacations that conflicted with the original opening brief deadline and the oral 
argument date.  The undersigned need not determine whether each of those requests was entirely 
reasonable; it is enough to note that all but one of the requests were granted or granted in part by 
the Court of Appeals and none rise to the level of conduct that would justify attorney’s fees under 
section 1927.  See e.g. Julien v. Zeringue, 864 F.2d 1572, 1575–76 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (awarding 
                                                          
8 Defendants also ask the Court to draw a negative inference against Plaintiff regarding the good faith and sincerity 
with which they approached settlement discussions, which was one reason Plaintiff sought an extension of time.  ECF 
No. 62-1 at 25.  But Defendants have provided no evidence of bad faith by Plaintiff other than that Defendants did not 
believe Plaintiff’s settlement offers were reasonable.  Id. 
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attorney’s fees under section 1927 where counsel “continually missed deadlines, requested at least 
10 extensions of time to file his briefs,” and “requested a six-week extension of time to file a brief 
because he did not realize the brief was already overdue”); Steinert v. Winn Group, Inc., 440 F.3d 
1214, 1217–18 (10th Cir. 2006) (awarding fees where counsel “embarked on a five-month 
extension-seeking campaign” during which he sought thirty extensions of time and most of the 
requests were made after the deadline counsel sought to extend had already passed). 
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends denying Defendants’ request for attorney’s fees 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. 
B. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (Copyright Act) and 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (Lanham Act) 
Defendants also seek attorney’s fees for Plaintiff’s three federal causes of action:  one under 
the Copyright Act and two under the Lanham Act.  See ECF No. 62-1 at 25–26.  Section 505 of 
the Copyright Act authorizes a district court, “in its discretion,” to award “a reasonable attorney’s 
fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.”  17 U.S.C. § 505.  Under the Lanham Act, the court 
“in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”  15 U.S.C. § 
1117(a).  The undersigned finds that Defendants are entitled to a fee award under both acts.  As 
detailed below, Defendants are prevailing parties as to Plaintiff’s copyright and trademark claims.  
Further, Defendants are entitled to fees under both the Copyright Act’s factor-based test and the 
Lanham Act’s “exceptional case” test. 
1. Prevailing Party Status 
Although courts apply different tests to determine whether fee awards are appropriate 
under the Copyright Act and the Lanham Act, both statutes permit fee awards only to prevailing 
parties.  The D.C. Circuit has developed a three-part test for determining prevailing party status, 
which applies to both Acts: “(1) there must be a court-ordered change in the legal relationship of 
the parties; (2) the judgment must be in favor of the party seeking the fees; and (3) the judicial 
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pronouncement must be accompanied by judicial relief.”  Green Aviation Mgmt. Co. v. FAA, 676 
F.3d 200, 203 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Turner v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 608 F.3d 12, 15 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010)).  Defendants seeking to recover attorney’s fees need only prove the latter two 
requirements.  See District of Columbia v. Straus, 590 F.3d 898, 901 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (applying 
the second and third prongs to analyze whether a defendant seeking fees was a prevailing party); 
Green Aviation, 676 F.3d at 204 (same). 
A defendant who successfully defends against a plaintiff’s claims leading to their dismissal 
obtains prevailing party status because it is both a judgment in the party’s favor and it is 
accompanied by judicial relief in the form of res judicata protection against relitigating the 
plaintiff’s claims.  Green Aviation., 676 F.3d at 201; see also CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC, 
__ U.S. __, __, 136 S. Ct. 1642, 1651 (2016) (“The defendant has . . . fulfilled its primary objective 
whenever the plaintiff’s challenge is rebuffed, irrespective of the precise reason for the court’s 
decision.”); Noxell Corp. v. Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-Que Rest., 771 F.2d 521, 526 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(“[I]n obtaining dismissal of the proceeding [for improper venue], [defendants] qualify as 
‘prevailing parties’ under the Lanham Act fee award provision.”); cf. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 
U.S. 517, 520 (1994) (awarding fees under the Lanham Act to a prevailing defendant “after his 
successful defense of the action”). 
Here, Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants are prevailing parties as to the copyright 
and trademark claims.  See ECF No. 63 at 38 (recognizing Defendants as a prevailing party).  
Indeed, by obtaining dismissal of those claims, Defendants obtained judgment in their favor and 
judicial relief in the form of res judicata protection against relitigating those claims.  See Green 
Aviation, 676 F.3d at 201.  Defendants also prevailed on appeal because the D.C. Circuit affirmed 
the district court order dismissing those claims.  Defendants are therefore prevailing parties.  
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2. The Copyright Act 
 Under the Copyright Act, fee awards are available to prevailing defendants as well as 
prevailing plaintiffs.  “[D]efendants should be ‘encouraged to litigate [meritorious copyright 
defenses] to the same extent that plaintiffs are encouraged to litigate meritorious claims of 
infringement.’”  Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., __ U.S. __, __, 136 S. Ct. 1979, 1985 (2016) 
(second alteration in original) (quoting Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 527).  While the language of section 
505 of the Copyright Act “eschews any ‘precise rule or formula’ for awarding fees,” id. (quoting 
Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 533), courts should give “‘substantial weight’ to the reasonableness of a losing 
party’s litigating positions while also considering other relevant circumstances,” id. at 1989.  
Courts should also consider other factors, including:  “frivolousness, motivation . . . and the need 
in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.”  Fogerty, 
510 U.S. at 534 & n.19; see also Prunty v. Vivendi, 195 F. Supp. 3d 107, 111–13 (D.D.C. 2016) 
(applying the Fogerty factors to analyze defendants’ motion for fees under the Copyright Act); 
ZilYen, Inc. v. Rubber Mfrs. Ass’n, 958 F. Supp. 2d 215, 218–22 (D.D.C. 2013) (same). 
Defendants argue that the Court should award fees in this case because Plaintiff’s copyright 
claim was objectively unreasonable and such an award will deter similarly meritless claims in the 
future by this plaintiff and others.  ECF No. 62-1 at 26.  Having considered the factors discussed 
above, the undersigned agrees.  Although Plaintiff’s copyright claim may not have been frivolous, 
it was objectively unreasonable. 
   a. Objective Unreasonableness 
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s copyright claim was objectively unreasonable because it 
failed to allege “any act of infringement within the United States, making its claim clearly without 
merit and devoid of factual basis.”  ECF No. 62-1 at 27.  For its part, Plaintiff contends that 
Case 1:17-cv-02327-TJK-GMH   Document 65   Filed 06/08/21   Page 15 of 57
16 
Defendants’ argument amounts to no more than arguing that their success on the motion to dismiss 
and on appeal are “synonymous with objective unreasonableness.”  ECF No. 63 at 27.  Although 
“assess[ing] whether a losing party advanced an unreasonable claim” is “closely related to what 
the court has already done” in deciding the merits of the case, courts considering fee motions under 
the Copyright Act should take care not to “confuse[ ] the issue of liability with that of 
reasonableness.”  Kirtsaeng, __ U.S. at __, 136 S. Ct. at 1987–88.  As the Supreme Court explained 
in Kirtsaeng, “[c]ourts every day see reasonable [arguments] that ultimately fail” and determining 
whether a claim or defense was objectively unreasonable requires courts to “distinguish[ ] between 
those [reasonable] defenses (or claims) and the objectively unreasonable variety.”  Id.  Thus, a 
successful motion to dismiss and appeal, alone, does not warrant fees under the Copyright Act.  
Instead, courts must consider whether the plaintiff’s claims were devoid of legal or factual basis.  
Courts have awarded fees under the Copyright Act where a plaintiff’s copyright claims 
were clearly contradicted by the record or devoid of legal basis.  In Scott-Blanton v. Universal City 
Studios Productions LLLP, for example, this Court concluded that plaintiff’s copyright claims 
were objectively unreasonable where the plaintiff’s arguments had “no factual grounding” and her 
claims were “flatly contradicted by the facts and ‘so implausible as to lie outside the realm of 
reason’” given that the alleged infringing work was created before the plaintiff’s work.  593 F. 
Supp. 2d. 171, 175 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Scott-Blanton v. Universal City Studios Productions 
LLLP, 246 F.R.D. 344, 348 (D.D.C. 2007)).  On the other hand, courts have found that 
unsuccessful claims and defenses were not objectively unreasonable where the parties were able 
to point to case law supporting their arguments.  For example, in ZilYen, this Court concluded that 
the plaintiff’s copyright claims were not objectively unreasonable, despite the defendant’s 
successful motion to dismiss, because “[t]here was a reasonable possibility that the Court would 
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reach a different outcome on the merits . . . in light of the lack of controlling authority in [the] 
Circuit.”  958 F. Supp. 2d at 220.  The Court continued by noting that plaintiff was able to “point 
to [out of Circuit] case authority in support of its position,” which “demonstrate[d] that the 
plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim [was] not ‘clearly without merit’ or ‘patently devoid of 
legal or factual basis.’”  Id.  Similarly, in Spanski Enterprises, Inc. v. Telewizja Polska, S.A., this 
Court concluded that defendant’s unsuccessful defenses were not objectively unreasonable 
because “both parties [ ] presented serious defenses and arguments for [the] court to adjudicate” 
and “[t]he mere fact that the court determined that [the plaintiff] carried its burden of proof and 
that [the defendant’s] defenses were insufficiently meritorious [did] not establish 
unreasonableness.”  278 F. Supp. 3d 210, 215 (D.D.C. 2017).    
Here, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s copyright claims were “devoid of legal basis” 
because Plaintiff improperly attempted to apply U.S. copyright law to actors and actions entirely 
abroad and did not cite any case law, in this Circuit or otherwise, that could support its arguments.  
As Judge Kelly’s decision explained, “[i]t is axiomatic that United States copyright law does not 
apply extraterritorially.”  IMAPizza, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 116–17 (quoting Yount v. Acuff Rose-
Opryland, 103 F.3d 830, 835 (9th Cir. 1996)); see also Rundquist v. Vapiano SE, 798 F. Supp. 2d 
102, 123 (D.D.C. 2011) (collecting cases).  Yet Plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege any “acts 
[that] plausibly constituted infringement within the United States.”  IMAPizza, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 
118.  The only actions that occurred in the United States were Defendants’ visits to Plaintiff’s 
restaurants, where they allegedly took photographs of those restaurants.  Id.  Judge Kelly found 
Plaintiff’s copyright claim premised on those actions to be “meritless” and explained that it went 
against “the obvious and inescapable inference that [Plaintiff’s] restaurants were and are open to 
the public” and thus cannot be a basis for copyright infringement as a matter of law.  Id. at 118–
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19.  The D.C. Circuit agreed, concluding that Plaintiff’s argument “fail[ed] because the Copyright 
Act does not create a right to prevent the taking of pictures of an architectural work ‘if the building 
in which the work is embodied is located in or ordinarily visible from a public space.’”  IMAPizza, 
965 F.3d at 878 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 120(a)).  Plaintiff also argued that downloading images 
hosted on U.S. servers constituted infringement within the United States.  IMAPizza, 334 F. Supp. 
3d at 119.  Judge Kelly rejected that argument, as well, explaining that it was not hard to conclude 
that the alleged infringing act—downloading—occurred in the U.K. where Defendants were 
located, not the U.S.  Id.  Again, the D.C. Circuit agreed, noting that Plaintiff provided “no 
technical, legal, or other support . . . for the proposition that downloading a picture from a server 
located in the U.S. creates a copy of that picture in the U.S.”  IMAPizza, 965 F.3d at 877–78.  Thus, 
Plaintiff’s copyright claim was “devoid of legal basis” and there was not a “reasonable possibility” 
that this Court or the Court of Appeals could have concluded otherwise. 
Nevertheless, Plaintiff advances three arguments for why its copyright claim was not 
unreasonable.  First, it argues that the extraterritorial copyright claim was reasonable because 
under international intellectual property law conventions, “a U.S. copyright holder may, without 
any need for copyright registration in the U.K., enforce infringement under U.K. copyright law to 
the same extent as a U.K. national.”  ECF No. 63 at 28.  Second, Plaintiff argues that its copyright 
claim was reasonable because “a number of authorities” support “the legal proposition that a 
download from a U.S. server constitutes a U.S. predicate act.”9  Id. at 28.  Finally, Plaintiff argues 
that at the time it filed its complaint, existing case law in other districts supported its contention 
                                                          
9 As Judge Kelly’s decision explained, the predicate act doctrine, adopted in several circuits, holds that “if the 
defendant has committed a domestic act of copyright infringement, and that act has enabled further acts of 
infringement abroad, then the plaintiff may recover damages for the foreign conduct.”  IMAPizza, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 
117 (citing Tire Eng’g & Distribution, LLC v. Shandong Linglong Rubber Co., 682 F.3d 292, 306-07 (4th Cir. 2012)). 
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that plaintiffs may advance U.S. copyright claims where “part of an act of infringement” is 
committed in the United States, and that its claims cannot therefore have been unreasonable.  Id. 
at 30.  Taking each of these arguments in turn, as Judge Kelly’s and the D.C. Circuit’s opinions 
made clear, Plaintiff’s copyright claim was objectively unreasonable because Plaintiff failed to 
allege any infringing act that “plausibly constituted infringement within the United States.”  
IMAPizza, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 118; IMAPizza, 965 F.3d at 879.  None of the arguments Plaintiff 
advances here changes that conclusion. 
i. International Agreements 
Plaintiff’s invocation of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works and the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty are unavailing.  As a 
preliminary matter, Plaintiff did not make this argument before Judge Kelly or the Court of 
Appeals (see ECF No. 23; Appellant Brief, IMAPizza, 956 F.3d. 817 (No. 18-7168)) and thus 
Plaintiff cannot now use the argument as a post hoc rationale to make its earlier copyright 
arguments objectively reasonable.  In any event, neither treaty provides for the extraterritorial 
application of United States copyright law. 
The Berne Convention, “which took effect in 1886, is the principal accord 
governing international copyright relations. Latecomer to the international copyright regime 
launched by Berne, the United States joined the Convention in 1989.”  Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 
302, 306–07 (2012).  Among other things, the Berne Convention provides that “[a]uthors shall 
enjoy . . . in [signatory countries] other than the country of origin, the rights which their respective 
laws do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals.”  Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works, Art. 5, § 1, Sept. 9, 1886 (as amended on Sept. 28, 1979), S. Treaty 
Doc. No. 99-27 (1986) [hereinafter, Berne Convention].  However, the Berne Convention does not 
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provide for extraterritorial application of member states’ copyright laws.  To the contrary, it states 
that “the extent of protection, as well as the means of redress afforded to the author to protect his 
rights, shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is claimed.”  
Berne Convention, Art. 5, § 2.   That is, the Berne Convention’s “central thrust . . . is the principle 
of ‘national treatment.’ A work of an American national first generated in America will receive 
the same protection in a foreign nation as that country accords to the works of its own nationals.”  
Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc'ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Golan 
v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1080 (10th Cir. 2010), aff'd, 565 U.S. 302 (2012) (“The Berne 
Convention requires each signatory to provide the same copyright protections to authors in other 
member countries that it provides to its own authors.”). 
The World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty is “a special agreement 
under the Berne Convention which deals with the protection of works and the rights of their authors 
in the digital environment.”  See WIPO Copyright Treaty, World Intellectual Property 
Organization, https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/ (last visited June 4, 2021).  Like the Berne 
Convention, it does not provide for extraterritorial application of a country’s copyright laws but 
contemplates domestic enforcement.  See World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright 
Treaty, Art. 14, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No 105-17 (1997) [hereinafter, WCT]  (providing 
that signatory countries are to “undertake to adopt, in accordance with their legal systems, the 
measures necessary to ensure the application of this Treaty” and that they “shall ensure that 
enforcement procedures are available under their law so as to permit effective action against any 
act of infringement of rights covered by this Treaty” (emphasis added)). 
Plaintiff does not explain why either of these treaties should render its extraterritorial 
copyright claim objectively reasonable.  If anything, these agreements might do the opposite.  As 
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another court has observed, “[e]xtraterritorial application of American law would be contrary to 
the spirit of the Berne Convention, and might offend other member nations by effectively 
displacing their law in circumstances in which previously it was assumed to govern.”  Subafilms, 
24 F.3d at 1097.  Accordingly, neither the Berne Convention nor the WCT provides support for 
Plaintiff’s extraterritorial copyright claim here. 
    ii. Downloads as Predicate Acts 
“Under the predicate act test, a court may apply the Copyright Act to foreign acts of 
infringement provided there was an initial infringing act in the U.S.”  IMAPizza, 965 F.3d at 878. 
Plaintiff argues that extant legal authority applying the predicate act doctrine supported its 
copyright claim that “a download from a U.S. server is enough to access U.S. copyright law.”  ECF 
No. 63 at 29.  But Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants downloaded pictures of its restaurants was 
inadequate to save its claims not because downloads qua downloads cannot constitute predicate 
infringing acts but because the specific downloads Plaintiff cited involved no allegation of 
infringement within the United States.  As Judge Kelly explained, under the predicate act doctrine, 
“where both the uploading and the downloading are unlawful (as in the many cases of illegal file-
sharing that have come before the federal courts), ‘Plaintiff[ ] need only show that United States 
users either uploaded or downloaded copyrighted works; Plaintiff[ ] need not show that a particular 
file was both uploaded and downloaded entirely within the United States.’”  IMAPizza., 334 F. 
Supp. 3d at 119 (quoting Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, No. CV 06-5578, 2009 WL 
6355911, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009)).  Here, Plaintiff alleged neither that the pictures were 
uploaded unlawfully to the websites hosting the images, nor that “Defendants downloaded the 
images at issue to computers located in the United States, merely that the pictures were 
downloaded from U.S. servers.”  IMAPizza., 334 F. Supp. 3d at 120.  The D.C. Circuit agreed, 
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noting that Plaintiff provided “no technical, legal, or other support . . . for the proposition that 
downloading a picture from a server located in the U.S. creates a copy of that picture in the U.S.”  
IMAPizza, 965 F.3d at 877–78.  
Both Judge Kelly’s and the D.C. Circuit’s decisions also rejected the cases that Plaintiff 
claims identified a server in the United States “as the link (or at least a link) to the U.S. that 
supported application of U.S. copyright law.”  ECF No. 63 at 28 (citing Liberty Media Holdings, 
LLC v. Vinigay.com, No. 11-cv-280, 2011 WL 7430062 (D. Ariz. Dec. 28, 2011), report and 
recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 641579 (D. Ariz. Feb. 28, 2012); Elsevier Ltd. v. Chitika, 
Inc., 826 F.Supp.2d 398 (D. Mass. 2011); Synopsys, Inc. v. Ubiquiti Networks, Inc., No. 17-cv-
00561, 2017 WL 3485881 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2017); see IMAPizza, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 120–21 
(distinguishing Liberty, Elsevier, and Synopsys); IMAPizza, 965 F.3d at 878 n.2 (same).  As Judge 
Kelly and the Court of Appeals explained, none of the cases supported Plaintiff’s position.  Two 
involved foreign defendants who, unlike Defendants here, allegedly “distributed infringing works 
into the United States, where they were downloaded.”  IMAPizza, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 120 (citing 
Liberty, 2011 WL 7430062, at *5; Elsevier, 826 F.Supp.2d at 402–03).  That is, they involved 
downloads that occurred in the United States and were thus domestic acts of infringement.  See 
also IMAPizza, 965 F.3d at 878 n.2 (distinguishing Liberty Media Holding by noting that it 
involved “display, distribution, and copying by Internet users in the United States” and 
distinguishing Elsevier by noting that it involved “a person in the U.S. download[ing] infringing 
copies from a website in India” (internal quotation marks omitted) (first quoting Liberty, 2011 WL 
7430062 at *5, then quoting Elsevier, 826 F. Supp. 2d at 402–03)).  The third case cited by Plaintiff 
is also inapposite because, as Judge Kelly explained, it “did not involve a traditional copyright 
claim, but claims for circumvention of copyright protection systems under the Digital Millennium 
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Copyright Act,” IMAPizza, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 121, and, as the D.C. Circuit explained, it involved 
“unauthorized reproduction of copyrighted files across ‘communications networks, file 
repositories, email servers, IP addresses, and website domains hosted in the United States’ and [ ] 
importation of counterfeit access keys from Taiwan that were used on computers based in the U.S,” 
IMAPizza, 965 F.3d at 878 n.2 (quoting Synopses, 2017 WL 3485881 at *3–5).10 
Similarly unpersuasive is Plaintiff’s assertion that the law on when a copy is made within 
the context of downloading images is not settled and thus its argument that an infringing copy was 
made the instant the download from U.S. servers occurred—rather than when the image was 
reproduced onto Defendants’ devices in Scotland—was not objectively unreasonable.  ECF No. 
63 at 29.  In support, Plaintiff notes that Judge Kelly used a “cf.”11 citation to an unpublished case 
to support his conclusion that the copy occurred when the image was reproduced on Defendants’ 
devises in Scotland.  Id.  Plaintiff argues that that shows the issue was an open question not 
resolved by existing case law.  Id.  Not so.  Judge Kelly cited more than a single, unpublished case 
to support his conclusion that a “copy” occurs when the image is reproduced and concluded that 
“[that] answer [was] not hard to find.”  IMAPizza, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 119–120 (citing the language 
of the Copyright Act, a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and 
a legal treatise on copyright law to support conclusion regarding when a copy is made).  Plaintiff, 
on the other hand, provided no authority for its position, as the D.C. Circuit recognized when it 
                                                          
10 Plaintiff contends that “[a] contrary rule would mean that an illegal video download company could purchase 
legitimate  copies of U.S. movies, and distribute them to the entire world (other than the U.S.) from a U.S. server 
without liability under U.S. copyright law, with the U.S. movie company powerless to pursue complete relief unless 
it did so under the copyright laws of the 194 countries in the world other than the U.S.”  ECF No. 63 at 29.  Plaintiff 
made this exact argument, word-for-word, to the D.C. Circuit and the court rejected it.  See IMAPizza, 965 F.3d at 
879 (re-stating Plaintiff’s argument and concluding that Plaintiff’s fears were incorrect because the hypothetical 
described “[t]he unauthorized upload of a video to a server in the U.S. for unauthorized distribution abroad[,] [which] 
would be an act of infringement in the U.S”). 
11 The “cf.” signal is used when “[t]he authority is different from the main proposition but sufficiently analogous to 
lend support.”  The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation R. 1.2(a) (Columbia L. Rev. Ass’n et al. eds., 21st ed. 
2020). 
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agreed with Judge Kelly and observed that Plaintiff “provide[d] no technical, legal, or other 
support . . . for the proposition that downloading a picture from a server located in the U.S. creates 
a copy of that picture in the U.S. in addition to the copy where the receiving device is located.”  
IMAPizza, 965 F.3d at 878–79 (emphasis added).   
Accordingly, the predicate act theory provided no reasonable basis for Plaintiff’s 
extraterritorial copyright claim. 
    iii. Plaintiff’s “Not Entirely Abroad” Theory 
Plaintiff’s third attempt to justify the reasonableness of its copyright claims fares no better.  
It argues that the complaint “state[d] a claim for a scheme that began in the U.S. and culminated 
with the opening of an infringing restaurant in Scotland” and that the Copyright Act applies where 
“’even part of an act of infringement’ was in the U.S.”  ECF No. 63 at 30, 32 (quoting IMAPizza, 
334 F. Supp. 3d at 121).  As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff contends the Court should assess this 
argument independent of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Spanski (upon which Judge Kelly relied 
“in determining how to apply principles of extraterritoriality), because the Circuit issued that 
decision “a year after the Complaint was filed and well after the [motion to dismiss] [o]pposition 
was filed,” and Plaintiff’s invocation of the Copyright Act was therefore “objectively reasonable 
under existing law.”  ECF No. 63 at 31.  Plaintiff’s argument fails.  First, the Spanski court’s 
decision is consistent with the Copyright Act’s preexisting extraterritoriality case law.  See 
Spanski, 883 F.3d at 916 (“[The parties] point to multiple district court decisions holding, as do 
we, that an infringing performance that originates abroad but terminates in the United States 
constitutes a domestic Copyright Act violation.”).  Second, as discussed below, the pre-Spanski 
authority cited by Plaintiff also did not support its copyright claim.  So, Spanski did not work a 
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change in law that rendered Plaintiff’s copyright claim objectively unreasonable; it was objectively 
unreasonable under pre-Spanski law. 
In any event, the D.C. Circuit rejected Plaintiff’s “not entirely abroad” argument as flawed 
as it “conflate[d] the ‘predicate act’ test . . . with [Plaintiff’s] own novel ‘partial-act’ theory.’”  
IMAPizza, 965 F.3d at 878.   Judge Kelly’s decision also rejected the argument, finding that “th[e] 
principle, assuming it is correct, is irrelevant” because, again, Plaintiff did not allege any domestic 
infringement.  IMAPizza, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 121.  As Judge Kelly explained, cases that could 
support Plaintiff’s argument involve “exclusive rights to distribute, display or perform copyrighted 
works,” and they involve acts by at least two people, one of whom distributes, displays, or performs 
the work, and another who receives it.  Id.; see also Shropshire v. Canning, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 
1145–46 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (collecting cases and explaining that the transmission of an infringing 
video from Canada to third-party servers in California that made the video “accessible and viewed 
by those within the United States” was not extraterritorial even though the infringing video was 
created in Canada and the transmission originated in that country); L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters 
Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 1998), as amended on denial of reh’g and reh’g 
en banc (Aug. 25, 1998) (finding that extraterritoriality did not bar the plaintiff from recovering 
damages for international distribution of works unlawfully reproduced in the United States).   
That is, for Plaintiff’s claims to have been cognizable, they would have needed to allege 
something more than that Defendants undertook a series of non-infringing actions in the United 
States before engaging in infringement overseas.  They needed to have alleged that Defendants 
took some sort of unlawful action—making, transmitting, or downloading infringing materials—
in the United States.  Plaintiff’s Complaint alleged nothing of the sort.  It alleged only that 
Defendants visited Plaintiff’s restaurants, took pictures in those restaurants, and downloaded 
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images from servers in the United States.  ECF No. 1 at 9–12.  As both Judge Kelly and the D.C. 
Circuit explained, none of those alleged actions amount to infringement.  IMAPizza, 334 F. Supp. 
3d at 117–21; IMAPizza, 965 F.3d at 876–79.   Plaintiff’s theory that accessing its restaurants “and 
then returning to the United Kingdom to copy” their design elements is, as Judge Kelly held, 
“meritless” because the law is clear that infringement occurs where the defendant “reproduces, 
adapts, distributes, performs, or displays the copyrighted work,” not where the defendant accessed 
it.  IMAPizza, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 118.  The D.C. Circuit agreed, explaining that “even [Plaintiff] 
must recognized it has alleged an act of potential infringement that culminated where the infringing 
building was constructed, that is, in the U.K., not in the U.S.”  IMAPizza, 956 F.3d at 878.  
Likewise, as Judge Kelly held, Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants took pictures in its restaurant 
“cannot be infringing as a matter of law” because “[b]y statute, taking photographs of an 
architectural work is not infringement ‘if the building in which the work is embodied is located in 
or ordinarily visible from a public place.’” Id. at 118–19 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 120(a)).  Again, the 
D.C. Circuit agreed, explaining that “the Copyright Act does not create a right to prevent the taking 
of pictures of an architectural work ‘if the building in which the work is embodied is located in or 
ordinarily visible from a public place.’”  IMAPizza, 965 F.3d at 878 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 120(a)).  
Finally, as discussed above, Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants downloaded images from servers 
in the United States failed to state a claim under the Copyright Act because Plaintiff alleged neither 
that the images were uploaded unlawfully to United States servers, nor that the images were 
downloaded in the United States.  See IMAPizza, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 119–21; IMAPizza, 965 F.3d 
at 878–79.  And “in view of [Defendant’s] being located in the U.K.” when they downloaded the 
images, “[Plaintiff’s] allegations were insufficient to ‘support a plausible inference of domestic 
infringement.’”  IMAPizza, 965 F.3d at 877–78 (quoting IMAPizza., 334 F. Supp. 3d at 120).  Thus, 
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Judge Kelly and the D.C. Circuit did not, as Plaintiff suggests, simply reject application of an 
otherwise relevant “lower standard” applied by other courts in lieu of a higher standard, they 
instead rejected Plaintiff’s argument under any standard.  See IMAPizza, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 121; 
IMAPizza, 965 F.3d at 878–79. 
For these reasons, the undersigned finds that this was not a case where there was a 
“reasonable possibility” that the courts could have found Plaintiff’s arguments persuasive or where 
Plaintiff’s claims were an open question in the Circuit, with support from out-of-Circuit case law.  
Instead, Plaintiff’s attempt to apply U.S. copyright law to conduct that occurred entirely abroad 
was devoid of legal and factual basis.  
   b. Frivolousness 
While Defendants successfully argue that Plaintiff’s copyright claims were objectively 
unreasonable, Defendants do not argue that Plaintiff’s copyright claims were frivolous.  Despite 
using the heading “An Award of Fees Will Deter the Filing of Other Frivolous Claims,” 
Defendants go on to describe those claims as “unreasonable,” “flawed,” “inappropriate,” “legally 
unsupported,” and “near-frivolous,” but stop short of arguing that they were frivolous.  ECF No. 
62-1 at 29–31 (emphasis added).  The undersigned agrees.  Plaintiff’s arguments in support of its 
claims were unreasonable and legally meritless, but they were not frivolous.  This factor therefore 
weighs against an award of fees. 
c. Motivation 
On the issue of Plaintiff’s motivation, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s motive in filing its 
copyright claim in the United States was to avoid the U.K.’s default rule that the losing party pays 
attorney’s fees of the prevailing party.  ECF No. 62-1 at 32–33; ECF No. 64 at 18–20; cf. Alyeska 
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (“[F]or centuries in England 
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there has been statutory authorization to award costs, including attorneys’ fees.  Although the 
matter is in the discretion of the court, counsel fees are regularly allowed to the prevailing party.”).  
That is, Defendants allege Plaintiff was forum shopping.  See In re Herald, Primeo, & Thema Sec. 
Litig., No. 09 Civ. 289, 2011 WL 5928952, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2011) (finding that a 
plaintiff’s decision to sue in the United States to avoid other countries’ default fee shifting rules 
“suggests forum shopping”), aff’d sub nom. In re Herald, 730 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2013); see also 
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252 & n.18 (1981) (opining that the default American 
practice of “not tax[ing] losing parties with their opponents’ attorney’s fees” is one of several 
factors that make courts in the United States attractive even when a foreign forum would be more 
appropriate). 
There are two problems with Defendants’ argument.  First, it is unclear whether seeking 
tactical advantage is the sort of improper motivation this Fogerty factor contemplates.  Instead, 
courts assessing the motivation factor generally consider whether the plaintiff brought their action 
in bad faith.  See ZilYen, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 221 (considering the plaintiff’s motivation and finding 
that there was no evidence suggesting “plaintiff’s actions were taken solely to harass the defendant 
or without the belief that its copyright infringement claim rested on solid legal ground”); Choyce 
v. SF Bay Area Indep. Media Ctr., No. 13-cv-01842, 2014 WL 5597274, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 
2014) (finding the motivation prong did not weigh in favor of awarding fees where there was no 
evidence that the plaintiff’s pursuit of an unreasonable copyright claim was “motivated to harass 
[the defendants], or to pursue the lawsuit for anticompetitive reasons” but was instead motivated 
by his desire “to stop the publication of defamatory content” on defendants’ website), aff'd, 669 F. 
App’x 863 (9th Cir. 2016); Agee v. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 209, 211–12 
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(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding that the plaintiff’s motivation was to harass the defendant and awarding 
fees as a result). 
Defendants have also not introduced any evidence suggesting that Plaintiff’s reason for 
bringing its claims here—in its home district—was forum shopping or to avoid an award of fees 
under U.K. law; rather, Defendants offer only speculation as to Plaintiff’s motivation.  See ZilYen, 
958 F. Supp. 2d at 221 (“On the record here, the Court would have to speculate to reach the 
conclusion that the plaintiff had an inappropriate motivation in bringing this litigation or acted 
in bad faith in conducting it. That the Court cannot do.”); see also Philipp v. Fed. Republic of 
Germany, 248 F. Supp. 3d 59, 87 (D.D.C. 2017) (“[T]he Court finds no support for Defendants’ 
claim that Plaintiffs engaged in forum shopping when they brought their claims in the home forum 
of two of the three Plaintiffs.”), aff’d and remanded, 894 F.3d 406 (D.C. Cir. 2018), and vacated 
on other grounds, __ U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 703 (2021).  Accordingly, this Fogerty factor weighs 
against awarding attorney’s fees. 
d. Considerations of Compensation and Deterrence 
 Defendants argue that a fee award is warranted to deter future unreasonable extraterritorial 
copyright claims by these and other plaintiffs. 12  See ECF No. 62-1 at 29–31; ECF No. 64 at 20.  
Plaintiff argues that a fee award here would deter good faith claims and would fail to advance the 
Copyright Act’s policy goals.  See ECF No. 63 at 32–36.  Plaintiff further contends that an award 
                                                          
12 Defendants also argue that fees are appropriate under the Copyright Act to deter “Plaintiff’s overly aggressive and 
unreasonable positions during litigation, as well as Plaintiff’s disregard for this Court’s rules.”  ECF No. 62-1 at 31.  
Plaintiff’s disagree, and instead argue that Defendants’ “litigation misconduct . . . warrants denial of a fee award.”  
ECF No. 63 at 38.  Each party cites the other’s alleged failure to meet and confer, refusal to agree to extensions, and 
failure to follow court rules.  ECF No. 61-2 at 31–32; ECF No. 63 at 38–39.  While both parties clearly struggled to 
get along with the other side during these proceedings, neither points to the type of egregious litigation misconduct 
that would weigh in favor or against awarding fees under the Copyright Act.  See, e.g., Kirtsaeng, __, U.S. at __, 136 
S. Ct. at 1988–89 (noting that litigation misconduct could be a reason to order fee-shifting under the Fogerty factors 
and pointing to a case where a court awarded fees after the plaintiff filed a forged affidavit and a case where fees were 
awarded after the “copyright holder … filed hundreds of suits on an overbroad legal theory”). 
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of attorney’s fees here would not serve the purposes of the Copyright Act because “[a] dismissal 
on the basis of extraterritoriality does not promote or deter original authorship—it is neutral.”  ECF 
No. 63 at 34. 
 However, in evaluating this factor, courts look to the extent to which a fee award would 
deter not only infringement, but also improvident litigation.  As the Supreme Court explained in 
Kirtsaeng, fee awards are appropriate and advance the purposes of the Copyright Act where they 
discourage plaintiffs from bringing unreasonable claims or encourage defendants to defend against 
such claims: 
The copyright holder with no reasonable infringement claim has good reason not 
to bring suit in the first instance (knowing he cannot force a settlement and will 
have to proceed to judgment); and the infringer with no reasonable defense has 
every reason to give in quickly, before each side’s litigation costs mount.  All of 
those results promote the Copyright Act's purposes, by enhancing the probability 
that both creators and users (i.e., potential plaintiffs and defendants) will enjoy the 
substantive rights the statute provides. 
Kirtsaeng, __ U.S. at __, 136 S. Ct. at 1987; accord Prunty, 195 F. Supp. 3d at 112 (finding 
attorney’s fees promote the purposes of the Copyright Act by deterring meritless claims because 
“when a plaintiff pursues a meritless copyright claim without consequence, it invites others to do 
the same”); Scott-Blanton v. Universal City Studios Prods. LLP, 593 F. Supp. 2d 171, 176 (D.D.C. 
2009) (“[T]he underlying purposes of the Copyright Act are served by awarding attorneys’ fees to 
deter unnecessary and protracted proceedings, thereby encouraging objectively reasonable 
claims.”).  Or, as the Supreme Court observed in Fogerty, “defendants who seek to advance a 
variety of meritorious copyright defenses should be encouraged to litigate them to the same extent 
that plaintiffs are encouraged to litigate meritorious claims of infringement.”  510 U.S. at 527.  In 
that case, the Court found that by prevailing, the defendant had “increased public exposure to a 
musical work that could, as a result, lead to further creative pieces.”  Id.  Therefore, the Court 
explained that “a successful defense of a copyright infringement action may further the policies of 
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the Copyright Act every bit as much as a successful prosecution of an infringement claim by the 
holder of a copyright.”  Id. 
 Here, as discussed above, Defendants successfully defended against Plaintiff’s copyright 
claims, which were objectively unreasonable.  An award of fees to Defendants would discourage 
plaintiffs from bringing such baseless, extraterritorial claims in the future.  More generally, 
Plaintiff sought to punish Defendants for a variety of non-infringing activities in the U.S., 
including visiting restaurants, observing their design details, and taking photographs within the 
restaurants.  If copyright plaintiffs were routinely permitted to hale members of the public into 
court on the basis of these sorts of non-infringing activities, that would chill the public’s enjoyment 
of creative works.  Copyright Law does not countenance such a result.  An award of fees is 
therefore consistent with the purposes of the Copyright Act in this case.  Accordingly, this factor 
weighs in favor of awarding fees to Defendants. 
   e. Weighing the Factors 
As noted above, in determining whether fees are appropriate under the Copyright Act, 
courts should give “‘substantial weight’ to the reasonableness of a losing party’s litigating 
positions while also considering other relevant circumstances.”  Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1989.  
Here, the objective unreasonableness of Plaintiff’s extraterritorial copyright claim weighs heavily 
in favor of awarding fees.  So too do considerations of compensation and deterrence since an award 
of attorney’s fees would serve to deter future unreasonable copyright claims.  While Defendants 
do not argue that Plaintiff’s claims were frivolous and they have not introduced evidence 
suggesting Plaintiff undertook this litigation out of bad faith, these factors are outweighed by the 
objective unreasonableness of Plaintiff’s claims and the deterrent effect of a fee award.  ECF No. 
62-1 at 33; see also Budget Cinema, Inc. v. Watertower Assocs., 81 F.3d 729, 732 (7th Cir. 1996) 
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(finding attorney’s fees were appropriate under the Copyright Act despite there being “little 
indication of actual bad faith” on the plaintiff’s part because “the record demonstrates quite clearly 
that [the plaintiff’s] case against defendants was objectively unreasonable”); TCA Television Corp. 
v. McCollum, No. 15 Civ. 4325, 2017 WL 2418751, at *13–14 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2017), report 
and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 2932724 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2018) (awarding attorney’s 
fees despite finding no evidence of bad faith because the plaintiff’s copyright claims were 
objectively unreasonable—though mostly not frivolous—and considerations of compensation and 
deterrence counseled an award); Sofa Entm’t, Inc. v. Dodger Prods., Inc., No. CV 08-02616, 2010 
WL 6397558, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2010) (awarding attorney’s fees after finding the plaintiff’s 
copyright claim was not frivolous or made in bad faith, but that the claim was objectively 
unreasonable deterring similar claims would promote the Copyright Act), aff’d, 709 F.3d 1273 
(9th Cir. 2013); . 
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends awarding Defendants with reasonable 
attorney’s fees for their success defending against Plaintiff’s copyright claim. 
3. The Lanham Act  
 Under the Lanham Act, courts have discretion “in exceptional cases [to] award reasonable 
attorney fees to the prevailing party.”  15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).  The D.C. Circuit explained in Noxell 
Corp. v. Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-Que Restaurant that the requirement that a case be “exceptional” 
in this context is satisfied by “something less than ‘bad faith’” and is “most reasonably read to 
mean what the word is generally understood to indicate—uncommon, not run-of-the-mill.”  771 
F.2d 521, 526 (D.C. Cir. 1985); ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 971 
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (reversing a fee award where the court made no finding that the plaintiff acted 
willfully or in bad faith or that the case was otherwise exceptional in any respect).  The Supreme 
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Court has endorsed Noxell’s interpretation of the Lanham Act’s use of “exceptional,” extending it 
to the Patent Act’s identical fee-shifting provision, 35 U.S.C. § 285.  See Octane Fitness, LLC v. 
ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 554 (2014) (endorsing Noxell and holding “an 
‘exceptional’ case is simply one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength 
of a party’s litigating position (considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the 
unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated”)).  District courts should “determine whether 
a case is ‘exceptional’ in the case-by-case exercise of their discretion, considering the totality of 
the circumstances,” including the Fogerty factors.  Id. & n.6. 
The facts of Noxell are instructive to the Court’s analysis here.  In that case, a Maryland 
corporation initiated a trademark infringement lawsuit in this district against the operator of “two 
modest barbeque restaurants, both in San Francisco.”  Noxell, 771 F.2d at 523.  The plaintiff 
alleged that the defendant’s “use of ALARM terms at the bottom portion of [ ] labels to denote the 
‘hotness’ of the barbeque infringed upon [the plaintiff’s] registered ALARM marks placed 
conspicuously on chili mixes and other spicy products.”  Id.  The defendant had no office or 
employees outside of the San Francisco area, and no more than 200 cases of its barbeque sauce—
1.5 percent of its total sales—had been sold in the District of Columbia, while 40% of its sales 
occurred in California.  Id.  The defendant moved to dismiss the action for improper venue under 
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), and the D.C. Circuit ultimately ordered the case dismissed on those grounds.  
Id. at 523–524.  The Court of Appeals observed that the defendant had decided to file suit in the 
District of Columbia “simply to suit its own convenience,” that its choice of forum was “barely 
plausible in terms of the accessibility of relevant evidence,” and that a trial in this district would 
convenience plaintiffs but would “in no way serve the convenience of the defendants.”  Id. at 524 
(quoting Noxell Corp. v. Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-Que Rest., 760 F.2d 312, 317 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).  
Case 1:17-cv-02327-TJK-GMH   Document 65   Filed 06/08/21   Page 33 of 57
34 
The defendant moved for attorney’s fees under section 1117(a), and the D.C. Circuit granted the 
motion, explaining that it “regard[ed] as ‘exceptional’ [the plaintiff’s] decision to locate in the 
District of Columbia its suit against . . . the fledgling San Francisco barbeque business.”  Id. at 
526.  The Court of Appeals observed that it found “more than a hint of ‘economic coercion’ in [the 
plaintiff’s] choice of a distant forum and its mode of proceeding,” noting “most critically” that 
“litigating in the District of Columbia entailed not merely inconvenience but hardship for [the 
defendant].”  Id. (citations omitted) (first quoting Comidas Exquisitos, Inc. v. Carlos McGee’s 
Mexican Café, 602 F. Supp. 191, 199 (S.D. Iowa 1985), then quoting Noxell, 760 F.3d at 317). 
 Like the plaintiff in Noxell, Plaintiff in this case is also an industry incumbent that 
unjustifiably brought trademark claims against an out-of-district defendant, that, at the time, 
operated a single pizza restaurant thousands of miles away in Edinburgh, Scotland.  See IMAPizza, 
334 F. Supp. 3d at 122 (noting that Defendants’ business “operates solely in Scotland” and that 
“[a]s a single pizza restaurant, it is a quintessentially local business”).  While there are a variety of 
tests for determining when the Lanham Act might apply to extraterritorial conduct, Judge Kelly 
found that Plaintiff’s claims were “obviously deficient under any test” because Plaintiff had failed 
to allege that Defendants’ business had any plausible effect on commerce in the United States.  Id. 
at 122–23.  Plaintiff “provide[d] no concrete facts suggesting an effect on U.S. commerce, only 
supposition drawn from the unremarkable fact that U.S. tourists and university students—some of 
whom may live in markets where [Plaintiff] operates—visit[ ] Edinburgh, Scotland.”  IMAPizza, 
334 F. Supp. 3d at 123.  Judge Kelly further explained that “[i]f that were enough to state a claim, 
then the Lanham Act would extend to all commercial conduct occurring anywhere in the world 
that American tourists visit in significant numbers.”  Id.  On appeal, the D.C. Circuit agreed with 
Judge Kelly and rejected all of Plaintiff’s arguments in support of its claim that there was some 
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effect on U.S. commerce.  See IMAPizza, 965 F.3d at 880–81 (addressing effects on U.S. 
commerce arguments and concluding that Plaintiff “failed to allege some plausible effect—let 
alone a significant or substantial effect—upon U.S. commerce”).  While the claims in Noxell were 
dismissed for improper venue and the claims here were dismissed for seeking to apply the Lanham 
Act impermissibly extraterritorially, in both cases the plaintiff sought, without justification, to hale 
an out-of-district defendant, with little to no connection to the District of Columbia, into this Court.  
Thus, as in that case, Plaintiff’s “decision to locate in the District of Columbia its suit against . . . 
the [ ] [Scottish] [pizza] business,” Noxell, 771 F.2d at 526, was exceptional, and Defendants 
should be entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees for defending Plaintiff’s Lanham Act 
claims. 
The Fogerty factors do not counsel a different result.  Cf. Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 554 
& n.6 (explaining that courts should “determine whether a case is ‘exceptional’ in the case-by-case 
exercise of their discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances,” including the Fogerty 
factors).  The analysis of those factors as to Plaintiff’s Lanham Act claims mirrors that for its 
Copyright claim above.  While Plaintiff’s claims may not have been frivolous or brought in bad 
faith, they were objectively unreasonable, and that factor weighs heavily in favor of awarding fees.  
As noted above, Judge Kelly found Plaintiff’s claims “obviously deficient” regardless of the 
extraterritoriality test the Court applied because they failed to allege any plausible effect on United 
States commerce and the D.C. Circuit agreed.  IMAPizza, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 122; IMAPizza, 965 
F.3d at 880–81.  As to the deterrence and compensation factor, the Noxell court observed that 
“Congress intended to authorize fees for defendants subjected to ‘harassment’ by trademark 
owners” and found that the defendant in that case, “haled before a court some 3000 miles from the 
place of their activity, ha[d] encountered ‘harassment’ of the kind Congress meant to deter.”  
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Noxell, 771 F.2d at 525–26.  That reasoning applies equally to the claims in this case, and the 
deterrence factor therefore weighs in favor of awarding fees.  Accordingly, the Fogerty factors 
also support awarding Defendants reasonable attorney’s fees for their defense of Plaintiff’s 
extraterritorial trademark claims. 
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends awarding Defendants reasonable attorney’s 
fees for their success defending against Plaintiff’s Lanham Act claims. 
C. Rule 11 Sanctions 
Defendants seek Rule 11 sanctions because they argue that Plaintiff’s U.K. passing-off 
claim was frivolous.  ECF No. 62-1 at 40–44; ECF No. 64 at 21–25.  Pursuant to Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, sanctions may be imposed “‘where a party files a pleading, 
motion[,] or other paper with the court for an improper purpose, that is unwarranted by existing 
law, [ ] that is lacking evidentiary support,’ or that is not “reasonably based on belief or a lack of 
information.’”  Ahuruonye v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 312 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2018) (alterations 
in original) (internal citations omitted) (first quoting Henok v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 926 F. Supp. 
2d 100, 104 (D.D.C. 2013), then quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(4)).  “Rule 11 sanctions are an 
extreme punishment for filing pleadings that frustrate judicial proceedings.”  Id. (quoting Brown 
v. FBI, 873 F. Supp. 2d 388, 408 (D.D.C. 2012)); see also Naegele v. Albers, 355 F. Supp. 2d 129, 
144 (D.D.C. 2005) (“The imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is not something the court takes lightly; 
Rule 11 sanctions are an extreme punishment for filing pleadings that frustrate judicial 
proceedings.”). 
“A motion for sanctions must be made separately from any other motion.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
11(c)(2).  The party seeking sanctions must not file its motion until 21 days after serving it on the 
opposing party to provide the nonmoving party an opportunity to withdraw or correct the 
challenged pleading.  Id.  This procedural safe harbor rule “must be satisfied before the Court 
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considers the substantive aspects of [a] [party’s] motion.”  Brown, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 408.  Where 
a party moving for Rule 11 sanctions fails to comply with the safe harbor rule, its motion should 
be denied.  See id. (denying Rule 11 sanctions where the moving party served its motion only 6 
days before filing it); see also Phillips v. Mabus, 319 F.R.D. 36, 40 (D.D.C. 2016) (denying 
plaintiffs’ request for Rule 11 sanctions because they were “not stand-alone motions but rather are 
tacked on to their briefs in opposition to [ ] motions to strike, and the requests were not served on 
[the defendants] 21 days (prior to the requests being presented to the Court”); Henok, LLC, 926 F. 
Supp. 2d at 105 (denying a motion for sanctions served on opposing party the same day it was 
filed on the public docket); McManus v. District of Columbia, 530 F. Supp. 2d 46, 82 n.29 (D.D.C. 
2007) (declining to consider a fee request based on Rule 11 made at the end of a motion to dismiss 
because it was not made “separately from any other motion”). 
Here, Defendants’ request for attorney’s fees under Rule 11 is plainly deficient for two 
reasons.  First, their request is not “separate[] from any other motion,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2), 
but is instead integrated into their broader motion for attorney’s fees.  Cf. Philips, 319 F.R.D. at 
40; McManus, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 82.  Second, there is no evidence that Defendants served the 
motion on Plaintiff 21 days prior to filing, as is required by Rule 11’s safe harbor provision.  Cf. 
ECF No. 62 at 3 (certifying that the motion was served on Plaintiff’s counsel on October 30, 2020, 
the same day that it was filed); see also Henok, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 105. 
Pointing to this Court’s decision in Prunty v. Vivendi, which considered a motion for 
attorney’s fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54, the Copyright Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 
Defendants argue that “[w]hile a violation of Rule 11 is normally assessed in response to a motion, 
an award of fees pursuant to 54(d) can be based on a violation of Rule 11.”  ECF No. 62-1 at 41.  
But unlike the defendants in Prunty, who sought fees under Rule 54, Defendants do not seek fees 
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pursuant to Rule 54, they seek fees pursuant to Rule 11.  See ECF No. 62-1 at 8–10.  So, this 
Court’s holding in Prunty that “Rule 54 contains no requirements that, as a precursor to seeking 
fees [under Rule 54], a party must first file a motion under Rule 11” is irrelevant.  195 F. Supp. 3d 
at 111.  Accordingly, Defendants’ request for fees based on Rule 11 should be denied.   
D. Calculation of Reasonable Attorney’s Fees 
In determining the amount of attorney’s fees to which a litigant is entitled, “[t]he ‘lodestar 
approach’ has become the dominant method used by federal courts . . . .  Under that approach, the 
attorney’s fee is calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the 
litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.”  Harvey v. Mohammed, 951 F. Supp. 2d 47, 54 (D.D.C. 
2013) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel Wynn, 559 U.S. 542, 551 
(2010)).  When considering whether the hours expended were reasonable “court[s] may exercise 
discretion to reduce a fee award by particular amounts ‘in response to specific objections’ or ‘by 
a reasonable amount without providing an item-by-item account[ ].’” Id. (internal citation omitted) 
(first quoting DL v. Dist. of Columbia, 256 F.R.D. 239, 243 (D.D.C. 2009), then quoting Role 
Models America, Inc. v. Brownlee, 353 F.3d 962, 973 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).  Where a court awards 
fees under the Copyright Act and Lanham Act, it should “‘separately determine the amount of fees 
attributable to copyright and trademark claims’ and award fees only for work performed in defense 
of [those claims].”  Newborn v. Yahoo! Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 n.14, 12 (D.D.C. 2006) (quoting 
Invision Media Servs., Inc. v. Glen J. Lerner, 175 F. App’x 904, 907 (9th Cir. 2006)).  However, 
as the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, “the determination of fees ‘should not result in 
a second major litigation.’”  Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 
461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)).  “[T]rial courts need not, and indeed should not, become green-
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eyeshade accountants.  The essential goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough justice, 
not to achieve auditing perfection.”  Id. 
Defendants request $463,000.12 in fees and costs13 for litigation before this Court and the 
D.C. Circuit.14  ECF No. 62-2 at 2.  Defendants request encompasses all hours they expended 
litigating this case.  Id.  As explained below, the undersigned recommends granting Defendants 
$201,670.66 in attorney’s fees, which reflects the time and work spent litigating the copyright and 
trademark claims before this Court and the Court of Appeals, time spent on the original November 
2018 fee motion.  
1. Hourly Rates 
Defendants bear the initial burden of establishing that the rates billed were reasonable.  
Defendants must present evidence regarding “(1) ‘the attorneys’ billing practices’; (2) ‘the 
attorneys’ skills, experience, and reputation’; and (3) ‘the prevailing market rates in the relevant 
community.’”  Salazar v. Dist. of Columbia, 809 F.3d 58, 62 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Covington 
v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).  “[A]n attorney’s usual billing rate 
                                                          
13 Although Defendants’ state that they seek “$463,000.12 in attorney’s fees, . . . plus costs of $358.02” (ECF No. 62-
2 at 2), a review of Defendants’ invoice shows they incurred $462,641.50 in attorney’s fees and $358.62 in costs for 
a total of $463,000.12 (ECF No. 62-12 at 19, 34 (showing $212,529.00 in attorney’s fees before this Court and 
$250,112.50 in attorney’s fees before Court of Appeals, for a total of $462,641.50 in attorney’s fees); id. at 19, 35 
($0.60 in costs incurred before this Court and $358.02 in costs incurred before Court of Appeals).  So, Defendants’ 
attorney’s fee request is actually $462,641.50, plus costs of $358.02. 
 
14 It is not clear whether Defendants also seek to recover the fees charged by attorneys with Sheridan Ross, who 
represented Defendants at the beginning of the litigation.  In a single sentence buried in a section of their motion 
discussing the work experience of Patricia Ho, an attorney with Sheridan Ross, Defendants state “[t]he total fees 
sought for this work of Sheridan Ross prior to withdrawal is $25,020.00.”  ECF No. 62-1 at 47.  Defendants also attach 
Ms. Ho’s bio, as well as a Sheridan Ross invoice.  ECF No. 62-33 at 3–24.  But it is not clear, upon review of those 
documents, how Defendants reached the $25,020.00 figure and Defendants have not provided any other information 
or explanation for the undersigned to determine whether that figure is reasonable.  More, in multiple places, 
Defendants state, seemingly unequivocally, that they “seek an initial award of $463,000.12,” which presumably 
encompasses only the work of Dowd Scheffel attorneys because that is the precise amount included at the end of 
Dowd Scheffel’s invoice.  ECF No. 62-12 at 35; ECF No. 62-2 at 2; see also ECF No. 64 at 27 (“Defendants seek a 
total award of fees of $463.000.12).  To the extent Defendants actually seek a total award of fees of $488,020.12, the 
undersigned finds that Defendants have not met their burden of showing they are entitled to the additional $25,020.00 
in fees. 
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is presumptively the reasonable rate, provided that th[e] rate is ‘in line with those prevailing in the 
community for similar services. . . .’”  Kattan ex rel. Thomas v. District of Columbia, 995 F.2d 
274, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895–96 (1984)).  “To establish 
the prevailing market rate, a [party] must ‘produce satisfactory evidence—in addition to the 
attorney's own affidavits—that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the 
community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and 
reputation.’” Urban Air Initiative, Inc. v. EPA, 442 F. Supp. 3d 301, 321–22 (D.D.C. 2020) 
(quoting Eley v. District of Columbia, 793 F.3d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).   
In support of their fee motion, Defendants provide an affidavit from Matthew Dowd, a 
partner at Dowd Scheffel PLLC, attesting to the attorneys’ billing practices, and the education, 
skills, and experience of the attorneys who worked on this matter.  ECF No. 62-2.  Mr. Dowd avers 
that he graduated from law school in 2008 and that his partner, Robert Scheffel, graduated from 
law school in 1999.  Id. at 6–7.  According to each attorney’s biography, attached to the motion, 
both Mr. Dowd and Mr. Scheffel have extensive experience litigating intellectual property cases 
in federal courts.  ECF Nos. 62-19, 62-20.  With respect to their billing practices, Mr. Dowd 
explains that he and Mr. Scheffel typically charge $650 per hour, but pursuant to a negotiated rate, 
he charged Defendants $575 per hour and Mr. Scheffel charged Defendants $540 per hour.  ECF 
No. 62-2 at 6–7.  Defendants were also charged $125 per hour and $150 per hour for work done 
by law clerks.  ECF No. 64 at 29–30; see, e.g., ECF No. 62-12 at 24, 26 (charging $125 for “LC” 
entry and $150 for another “LC” entry).  Defendants have submitted detailed records indicating 
the tasks performed and time billed during this case.  See ECF No. 62-12.  To support the 
contention that their rates were at or below the prevailing market rate for similar services, 
Defendants note that their rates are well-below those included in the LSI Laffey Matrix.  ECF No. 
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62-1 at 47–48.  Specifically, Mr. Dowd charged $575, while the LSI Laffey Matrix provides for 
rates between $636 to $742 for an attorney with 8 to 12 years of post-law school experience.  See 
ECF No. 62-2 at 6.  And Mr. Scheffel, who had 18 to 21 years of experience during these 
proceedings, charged $540 per hour, while the LSI Laffey Matrix provides for rates between $717 
and $742 for an attorney with 11-19 years of post-law school experience.  Id. at 7.  As discussed 
below, Plaintiff does not challenge Defendants’ use of LSI Laffey Matrix as evidence that their 
hourly rates were reasonable.  See generally ECF No. 63 at 49–56.  Last, Defendants cite a case in 
this district where the Court approved similar rates in a copyright case.  See Spanski Enters., 278 
F. Supp. 3d at 219 (approving hourly rates that were “at or below the average hourly rate indicated 
by the LSI Laffey matrix”).  The undersigned finds that, taken together, this evidence is sufficient 
to meet Defendant’s burden of establishing that their hourly rates are reasonable.  Id. at 218–19 
(finding party met its burden of demonstrating reasonableness of rate with submission of affidavit, 
attorney bios, and invoices detailing tasks performed and time billed for each attorney, and where 
rates were at or below those included in the LSI Laffey Matrix).   
Plaintiff, for its part, challenges only the law clerk’s hourly rate of $150, arguing that 
Defendants provided no basis for why a law clerk should charge $150 per hour.  ECF No. 63 at 
55–56.  Plaintiff does not suggest what an appropriate rate for a law clerk would be.  Id.  In reply, 
Defendants explain that their firm hires law clerks from George Washington University School of 
Law with 1 to 2 years of legal education.  ECF No. 30.  Although Defendants do not provide much 
explanation as to why $150 is a reasonable hourly rate for a law clerk, the undersigned nonetheless 
concludes that $150 is reasonable because it is well below the LSI Laffey Matrix rate, which 
provides for rates between $196 and $202 for law clerks.  ECF No. 62-33 at 26. 
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Accordingly, the undersigned recommends finding Defendants’ hourly rates are 
reasonable. 
 2. Hours Reasonably Expended 
Having arrived at a reasonable rate for Defendants’ work, the hours reasonably expended 
must be determined.  Defendants “ha[ve] the burden of establishing the reasonableness of [their] 
fee request [with] ‘[s]upporting documentation [that] must be of sufficient detail and probative 
value to enable the court to determine with a high degree of certainty that such hours were actually 
and reasonably expended.’”  Role Models Am., 353 F.3d at 970 (fourth alteration in original) 
(internal citations omitted) (quoting In re Olson, 884 F.2d 1415, 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).  Here, 
Defendants seek fees for all hours expended litigating this case, as detailed in the invoice attached 
to Defendants’ motion.  See ECF No. 62-12 (invoice).  Plaintiff responds by identifying certain 
billing and staffing practices that it considers unreasonable and that is argues warrants an overall 
reduction in Defendants’ fee award.  ECF No. 63 at 49–50, 54–56.  Plaintiff also identifies a 
number of specific pleadings and proceedings for which it argues Defendants are not entitled to 
recover fees and in turn suggests specific monetary reductions, roughly calculated from 
Defendants’ invoice entries detailing work on those items.15  Id. at 51–54, 56.  The undersigned 
will address each objection below, by category, and will recommend appropriate reductions to the 
extent they are warranted.   
                                                          
15 In its reply, Defendants agreed to withdraw a number of fee categories, including fees incurred advising Defendants 
about the withdrawal of Sheridan Ross and hours billed as “NO CHARGE,” two categories of fees that Plaintiff argued 
should not be recoverable.  ECF No. 64 at 30.  Defendants stated that withdrawal amounted to a reduction of 
$15,757.37.  Id.  Accordingly, the undersigned recommends reducing Defendants’ fee award by $15,757.37. 
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a. Reduction for Exceptionally High and Unwarranted Fees 
Plaintiff first argues that $463,000.12 is “exceptionally high and unwarranted” and that this 
Court may deny such an outrageous request in its entirety.  ECF No. 63 at 50.  Plaintiff points to 
a number of cases where courts have recognized that outrageous requests may be denied, “lest 
claimants feel free to make ‘unreasonable demands, knowing that the only unfavorable 
consequence of such misconduct would be reduction of their fee to what they should have asked 
for in the first place.’”  Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Reilly, 1 F.3d 1254, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting 
Brown v. Stackler, 612 F.2d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1980)).  Courts have on occasion denied awarding 
fees outright or denying fees billed by particular attorneys, but those instances involved 
particularly egregious overbilling.  For example, in Environmental Defense Fund, an attorney 
spent nearly an entire work week drafting a one-and-one-half page letter and 3.5 hours completing 
a Notice of Appearance.  Envtl. Def. Fund, 1 F.3d at 1259.  After reviewing a number of these 
“most egregious examples” the court concluded that those specific entries “cast a fatal doubt upon 
the efficiency of [the attorney’s] work” and thus denied all fees associated with that attorney’s 
work.  Id.; see also Brown, 612 F.2d at 1059 (affirming the district court’s outright denial of an 
“intolerably inflated” fee request that claimed over 800 hours of billable time spent on a six-page 
complaint and a few motions for extension of time); Young v. Smith, 269 F. Supp. 3d 251, 272–72 
(M.D. Pa. 2017) (denying a fee request in full where the attorney “submitted an unprocessed fee 
bill, [and] request[ed] to be compensated for every billable increment that she . . . ever entered in 
[the] matter[,]” despite the fact that “her misconduct conditioned a new trial, she did not prevail 
whatsoever at the second trial, and several of [the] entries [had] no connection whatsoever to the 
[relevant] defendant or claim”).  Plaintiff has not pointed to any similarly “intolerably inflated” 
entries to support its argument that an outright denial is warranted in this case, nor has it pointed 
Case 1:17-cv-02327-TJK-GMH   Document 65   Filed 06/08/21   Page 43 of 57
44 
to case law suggesting $463,000 would be an outrageous amount compared to fee and cost awards 
in similar copyright cases successful before a trial court and court of appeals.  More, in Jordan v. 
United States Department of Justice, a case Plaintiff cites, the D.C. Circuit explained that “[t]otal 
denial of requested fees as a purely prophylactic measure . . . is a stringent sanction, to be reserved 
for only the most severe of situations, and appropriately invoked only in very limited 
circumstances,” such as “when the party seeking fees declines to proffer any substantiation in the 
form of affidavits, timesheets, or the like, or when the application is grossly and intolerably 
inflated, or manifestly filed in bad faith.”  691 F.2d 514, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (footnotes omitted).  
Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants’ fee request falls into the “most severe of situations” 
justifying an outright denial of the motion in full. 
b. Reduction for Block Billing  
Next, Plaintiff argues that because Defendants used block billing,16 an overall percentage 
reduction in the fee award is necessary.  ECF No. 63 at 50.  Plaintiff again does not point to any 
specific time entries to support its argument that Defendants included an unreasonable number of 
tasks in each entry or a description so vague it would be impossible to determine for what work 
Defendants were billing.  To be sure, “block billing is disfavored in this jurisdiction . . . because it 
makes review of the reasonableness of an attorney's hours difficult,” Cobell v. Jewell, 234 F. Supp. 
3d 126, 173 (D.D.C. 2017), and Defendants did block bill a few entries.  See, e.g., ECF No. 62-12 
at 10 (including time spent on letter regarding settlement discussions, as well as research on forum 
non conveniens and reviewing letter regarding request for extension to file jurisdictional affidavit); 
id. at 21 (including time spent on call regarding settlement discussions, as well as drafting motion 
                                                          
16 Block billing is when multiple activities are “lumped together in a single entry with no indication how much time 
was spent on each task.”  Cobell v. Norton, 407 F. Supp. 2d 140, 159 (D.D.C. 2005).  Block billing time entries leaves 
courts “left to approximate the amount of time which should be allocated to each task.”  Id. 
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for sanctions); id. at 22 (including time spent drafting sanctions motions, as well as time spent 
reviewing and revising appeal brief).  But a review of Defendants’ invoice shows the vast majority 
of time entries are reasonably detailed and separated by task, “provid[ing] sufficient information 
to assess the particular tasks performed and the reasonableness of the time expended on those 
tasks.”  Spanski, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 220.  Indeed, a review of Defendants’ invoice suggests 
approximately 20 entries were arguably block billed, out of approximately 350 entries.  See 
generally ECF No. 62-12.  Accordingly, the undersigned does not believe an overall reduction in 
the fee award is warranted simply because Defendants block billed some time entries.  See Tridico 
v. District of Columbia, 235 F. Supp. 3d 100, 109 (D.D.C. 2017) (noting that “[w]here block billing 
is used infrequently . . . a reduction may not be warranted”); Spanski, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 220–21 
(declining to reduce a fee award on the basis of block billing where “[a]lthough some entries may 
have been vague or more crowded with tasks than others, the court [was] not of the view that 
[those] entries were so numerous and/or unintelligible as to preclude the court’s ability to assess 
the reasonableness of the time expended”); Fitts v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 680 F. Supp 2d 38, 
42 (D.D.C. 2010) (declining to reduce fee award where block billing was used in a “relatively 
small fraction of entries”). 
c. Fees Billed for D.C. Circuit Sanctions Motion 
Plaintiff next argues that Defendants should not recover fees expended on the motion for 
sanctions filed before the D.C. Circuit because it was unsuccessful.  ECF No. 63 at 51.  This 
argument is more persuasive than Plaintiff’s first two arguments.   
Defendants filed their unsuccessful motion for sanctions before the D.C. Circuit.  Motion 
for Sanctions, IMAPizza, 956 F.3d 871.  Their motion argued that sanctions were warranted 
because Plaintiff’s opening brief advanced a meritless argument; specifically, that the District 
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Court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint without leave to amend.  Id. at 8.  Defendants 
argued that Plaintiff failed to inform the Court of Appeals that it had never sought leave to amend 
from the District Court, failed to cite “binding adverse precedent” establishing that Plaintiff was 
required to file a Rule 59 motion seeking leave to amend, and raised new arguments for the first 
time on appeal.  Id. at 8–9.  The Court of Appeals denied Defendants motion for sanctions.  
IMAPizza, 956 F.3d 871 (per curiam order denying motion for sanctions).  
Courts in this Circuit have held that “a court should deny fees for time unsuccessfully 
expended when ‘the [party] has failed to prevail on a claim that is distinct in all respects from [its] 
successful claims.’”  Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. DHS, 811 F. Supp. 2d 216, 237–38 (D.D.C. 
2011) (second alteration in original) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440); see also Nat’l Ass’n of 
Concerned Veterans v. Sec’y of Def., 675 F.2d 1319, 1327 & n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (recognizing 
that courts should exclude fees expended on “truly fractionable” issues on which parties did not 
prevail); Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891–92 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting that “no 
compensation should be paid for time spent litigating claims upon which the party seeking the fee 
did not ultimately prevail”).  Here, Defendants’ motion for sanctions before the D.C. Circuit was 
“distinct in all respects from” the successful Copyright Act and Lanham Act defenses for which 
Defendants are entitled to fees.  It focused on Plaintiff’s argument, raised in its opening brief, that 
the District Court should have allowed it to amend its Complaint prior to dismissal.  Defendants 
argue that the sanctions motion was “necessary to explain the lack of merit of Plaintiff’s appeal.”  
ECF No. 64 at 26.  But Defendants do not explain why a sanctions motion was the necessary or 
appropriate vehicle to explain the lack of merit of Plaintiff’s opening brief; that is the obvious 
purpose of a response brief.  And, indeed, Defendants’ response brief, which was filed on the same 
day as the sanctions motion, did in fact raise the arguments include in the sanctions motion.  See 
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Response Brief at 16–26, IMAPizza, 956 F.3d 871 (explaining why Plaintiff’s arguments regarding 
leave to amend were meritless).  Defendants further contend that the D.C. Circuit “ultimately 
adopted the . . . arguments” included in their sanctions motion about Plaintiff’s leave to amend 
argument and so they should still be awarded fees for hours expended on the motion.  ECF No. 64 
at 26.  But Defendants do not point to any part of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion referencing their 
sanctions motion or point to a single case where a court awarded attorney’s fees for an unsuccessful 
motion simply because a court later reached the same conclusions presented in that unsuccessful 
motion.  Id. at 26–27.  In any event, the undersigned finds it more likely that the D.C. Circuit 
adopted the arguments to the extent they were included in Defendants’ response brief, rather than 
their sanctions motion—which, after all, the court denied.  Accordingly, the undersigned 
recommends reducing the fee award by $52,000, which is a rough estimate of the fees billed related 
to that unsuccessful motion.17  
d. Fees Billed for United Kingdom Proceedings 
Plaintiff similarly argues that Defendants should not be awarded fees based on work that 
pertained to proceedings in the U.K., as those are unrelated to the claims that were before this 
Court.  ECF No. 63 at 52.  Again, the undersigned agrees.  Neither party explains what the U.K. 
trademark proceedings are.  See ECF No. 63 at 52, ECF No. 64 at 30.  But the undersigned assumes 
they refer to the proceedings before the UKIPO discussed in Part II.A.  See text accompanying 
note 6, supra.  Regardless, Defendants have not shown that fees are warranted for any proceedings 
occurring in the U.K.  Defendants’ only response is to say that the U.K. proceedings were “part 
and parcel” with the litigation before this Court, including settlement discussions.  ECF No. 64 at 
                                                          
17 Defendants do not take issue with the $52,000 estimate provided by Plaintiff and the undersigned finds, based on a 
rough calculation of Defendants’ invoice entries that mention the sanctions motion, that $52,000 is a reasonable 
estimate. 
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30.  But Defendants do not elaborate on how trademark proceedings in a different court, controlled 
by the laws of a different country, are “part and parcel” with the claims before this Court such that 
an award of fees under the United States Copyright Act and Lanham Act should encompass time 
spent pursuing litigation in a different country.  Defendants also do not cite any cases—nor could 
the undersigned find any—suggesting that where other proceedings in a different court are “part 
and parcel” with Lanham Act or Copyright Act claims that they should be included in a fee award 
under those statutes.  Indeed, the most relevant case law suggests that the appropriate standard 
would be whether the claims are “so intertwined that it is impossible to differentiate between work 
done on claims.”  Gracie v. Gracie, 217 F.3d 1060, 1069 (9th Cir. 2000); Pearson Educ., Inc. v. 
Tjiptowidjojo, No. 06 Civ. 6071, 2007 WL 2872439, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2007) (authorizing 
recovery for non-Copyright claims that were “inextricably intertwined, both legally and 
factually”).  But even those cases dealt with claims in a single lawsuit, before a single court.  At 
any rate, Defendants have not argued that the claims in the U.K. were legally and factually 
“inextricably intertwined” with the claims before this Court.  Accordingly, the undersigned 
recommends reducing the fee award by $6,842.50, which is a rough estimate of the fees billed 
related to those proceedings.18  
e. Claim-Counting vs. Page-Counting for Apportioning Fees 
Recall that Defendants request $463,000.12 in fees and costs only to the extent they are 
entitled to fees under section 1927, Rule 11, the Copyright Act, and the Lanham Act.  Because the 
undersigned recommends finding that Defendants are not entitled to fees pursuant to section 1927 
                                                          
18 Plaintiff points to the specific time entries that they argue billed time for matters related to the U.K. proceedings.  
ECF No. 63 at 52 n.24.  Defendants do not argue that those entries are not related to the U.K. proceedings (ECF No. 
64 at 30), and review of the time entries that Plaintiff cites confirms that all but one relate to the U.K. proceedings.  
The 6/8/2020 time entry, specifically, bills time spent to “[r]eview the new Federal Circuit copyright case on attorney’s 
fees; send same to RJS,” not the U.K. proceedings.  ECF No. 62-12 at 33.  Subtracting the $172.50 billed on 6/8/2020 
from Plaintiff’s estimate of $7,015 equals $6,842.50. 
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or Rule 11, a reduction in the overall fee request is warranted to limit fees to only those hours 
expended defending against the Copyright Act and Lanham Act claims.  Both parties agree on that 
point.  ECF No. 62-1 at 49–50; ECF No. 63 at 52–54.  The parties disagree on how to determine 
the percentage reduction that is warranted.  
Defendants propose a “claim-counting” methodology for determining the appropriate 
reduction.  Applying this methodology, Defendants explain that the Court should take the total 
number of causes of actions Defendants had to defend against and divide that by the number of 
claims for which Defendants are entitled to fees.  ECF No. 62-1 at 49–50; ECF No. 64 at 27–28.  
The resulting percentage is the percentage of fees to which Defendants claim they are entitled.  
Here, Defendants explain that there were 3 copyright and trademark claims out of 5 claims total, 
so they are entitled to 60 percent of the overall fee request, or a 40 percent reduction—3 divided 
by 5 is 0.6, or 60 percent.  Id.  Plaintiff, on the other hand, proposes a “page-counting” 
methodology.  ECF No. 63 at 52–54.  Applying this methodology, Plaintiff explains that the Court 
should take the number of  pages in the key documents—here, according to Plaintiff, that is the 
motion to dismiss, declarations included with the motion to dismiss, reply in support of the motion 
to dismiss, and response brief before the D.C. Circuit—devoted to the copyright and trademark 
arguments (versus the passing-off and trespass arguments) and divide that by the total number of 
argument pages in those documents.  Id.  The resulting percentage is the percentage of fees to 
which Defendants are entitled.  Id.  According to Plaintiff, Defendants devoted 43.25 pages to their 
Lanham Act and Copyright Act defenses in the abovementioned pleadings, out of a total of 85.5 
pages, which would entitle Defendants to 51 percent of the fees incurred, or a 49 percent 
reduction—43.25 divided by 85.5 is approximately .51, or 51 percent.  Id.  at 54.  Each party cites 
courts in this Circuit that have adopted its preferred approach.  See, e.g., Prunty, 195 F. Supp. 3d 
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at 117 (reducing total fees by 40 percent where there were 5 claims and only 3 were asserted under 
statutes with fee-shifting provisions); Turner v. D.C. Bd. of Elec. & Ethics, 354 F.3d 890, 894 
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (approving apportionment methodology based on pages directed at each 
successful claim).   
Whether to apportion fees based on the percentage of successful defenses or the portion of 
successful pages is a close call because both approaches can be reasonable.  On balance, though, 
the undersigned finds that Defendants have made more persuasive arguments in favor of the claim-
counting methodology.  First, as Defendants correctly point out, “fewer words generally means 
more time” and thus fewer pages does not necessarily mean counsel spent less time briefing that 
issue.  ECF No. 64 at 28.  Second, Defendants note that the “key issues” in this case were the 
copyright and trademark claims on which they prevailed and are now entitled to seek fees.  Id.  
Last, Defendants point out that Plaintiff, without explanation, did not include the fact and 
background sections of any of the briefs in their page count; however, those pages were necessary 
for their copyright and trademark defenses.  Id.  Plaintiff responds that “not all claims take up 
equal time” (ECF No. 63 at 53), which may be true, but Plaintiff does not go as far as to suggest 
that the copyright and trademark claims in this case took up less, let alone far less, time than the 
trespass and passing-off claims such that treating the five claims as equal would be unfair.   
Plaintiff also argued, under its page-counting proposal, that pages devoted to Defendants’ 
personal jurisdiction argument should be excluded.  ECF No. 63 at 52–53.  That may be 
appropriate under the page-counting methodology because, as Plaintiff points out, the personal 
jurisdiction argument was not successful.  Id.  However, Plaintiff does not argue that, should the 
Court adopt the claim-counting methodology, that personal jurisdiction should be treated as a sixth 
claim.  So, because the undersigned recommends apportioning fees based on the percentage of 
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Defendants’ success defending against the causes of action for which it is entitled to fees, there is 
no reason to omit a percentage of fees based on Defendants’ unsuccessful personal jurisdiction 
argument.  The undersigned is, however, persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that the unfair 
competition and infringement claims, two separate causes of action under the Lanham Act, were 
so similar that treating them as a single claim would be more reasonable.  ECF No. 63 at 53.  Even 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss recognized that the trademark infringement claim and unfair 
competition claim “ha[ve] nearly identical elements” (ECF 18 at 20–21) and the relevant question 
for either Lanham Act claim was whether Plaintiff had alleged a substantial effect on U.S. 
commerce (id. (addressing both Lanham Act claims in a single section arguing no effect on U.S. 
commerce)).  Treating those two claims as a single Lanham Act claim would mean four claims 
total—the Copyright Act claim, the Lanham Act claim, the D.C. trespass claim, and the U.K. 
passing-off claim.  See ECF No. 1.  On that basis, Defendants are entitled to fees for their 
successful defense of two of those claims—the Copyright Act and Lanham Act claims.  See Part 
II.B.1, 2.  So, a 50 percent reduction is warranted to limit the award to those claims for which 
Defendants are entitled to fees. 
f. Reduction for “Top-Heavy” Staffing 
Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ fee award should be reduced by an additional 50 percent 
for inefficient “top-heavy” staffing because most time was billed by attorneys who were partners 
at the law firm.  ECF No. 63 at 54.  Plaintiff claims, without support, that “[m]ost of the entries 
for partners’ fees necessarily included ‘clerical and administrative services.’”  Id. at 55.  
Defendants respond that they staffed the case efficiently as a small, boutique law firm and that it 
is simply not true that the entries for partners’ fees included clerical and administrative services 
because their firm does not bill for that type of work.  ECF No. 64 at 28–29.   
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Courts recognize that “solo practitioners or [ ] small firms[ ] often lack the resources to 
retain a large staff of junior lawyers who [can] handle [certain] tasks more economically” and that 
“[d]enying [attorneys] compensation for [those] tasks would unfairly punish [attorneys] . . . for not 
staffing [ ] case[s] as if they had the manpower of a major law firm.”  Bailey v. District of 
Columbia, 839 F. Supp. 888, 891 (D.D.C. 1993), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in 
Fisher ex rel. Fisher v. District of Columbia, 517 F.3d 570 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see also In re Vitamin 
C Antitrust Litig., Nos. 06–md–1738, 05–cv–453, 2013 WL 6858853, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 
2013) (“It is also well known that [smaller] law firms frequently follow a different model than 
large mega-firms in terms of the allocation of work between partners and associates, placing much 
more responsibility at higher levels. I see no general infirmity in using this model.”); Cardiac 
Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., No. IP–96–1718, 2002 WL 1801647, at *6 (S.D. Ind. July 
5, 2002) (objection to top-heavy billing was “misguided,” “reflect[ed] a persistent but not always 
accurate caricature of law practice in which senior partners do relatively little hands-on work while 
more junior minions do the bulk of the work”).  The undersigned also sees no reason to reduce 
Defendants’ otherwise reasonable fee award simply because they have not hired more junior 
attorneys at their firm.  More, the cases Plaintiff cites in support of its argument all involved larger 
firms with varying levels of attorneys and specific instances of unreasonable, clerical work billed 
at the partner level.  Daiwa Special Asset Corp. v. Desnick, No. 00 Civ. 3856, 2002 WL 31767817, 
*4 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting specific entries where associate attorneys billed for clerical tasks, such 
as filing papers and bates labeling documents and where paralegals billed for non-legal tasks, such 
as moving boxes); Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. WB Music Corp., 520 F.3d 588, 596 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(noting that district court reduced fee award by 25 percent “to account for top-heavy billing by 
partners for work that could have been performed by associates”).  Neither case supports Plaintiff’s 
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argument here because, as discussed above, Plaintiff has not pointed to any specific instances 
where counsel billed for inappropriate tasks, such as clerical work, and Defendants’ counsel are 
part of a small, boutique law firm without junior-level staff.  Accordingly, no reduction for 
inefficient staffing is warranted. 
g. Fees-on-Fee Motion 
Defendants request fees for hours expended drafting the original fee motion filed in 
November 2018.  ECF No. 62-1 at 50–51.  Plaintiff does not challenge Defendants’ request for 
fees on that first motion and both parties agree that any fee award for work on the fee motion 
should be limited to successful arguments only.  ECF No. 63 at 56; ECF No. 64 at 30.  The 
undersigned agrees.  See Prunty, 195 F. Supp. 3d at 117 (awarding fees incurred in preparing 
motion for attorney’s fees and reducing the award “to reflect [d]efendants’ degree of success on 
their fee petition”); Noxell, 771 F.2d at 528 (noting that “the propriety of awarding compensation 
for time spent in preparing [a] fee petition . . . is settled in this circuit [and] [h]ours reasonably 
devoted to a request for fees are compensable”).  
Applying the claim-counting methodology discussed above in Part II.D.2.e., Defendants 
should be awarded 66 percent of their total fees billed for work on the November 2018 motion for 
fees.  Defendants’ November 2018 fee motion asserted three bases for fees:  (1) the Copyright Act; 
(2) the Lanham Act; and (3) Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  ECF No. 48-1.  The 
arguments with respect to each basis for fees included in Defendants’ November 2018 fee motion 
were virtually identical to the arguments in their renewed, October 2020 motion for fees.  Compare 
ECF No. 48-1, with ECF No. 62-1.  As explained in Part II.B. and C, Defendants have shown that 
they are entitled to fees under the Copyright Act and Lanham Act, but not under Rule 11.  So, 
success on two out of three bases for fees means Defendants are entitled to 66 percent of fees billed 
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for work on their November 2018 fee motion.  Accordingly, the undersigned recommends reducing 
the total fees billed for time spent on the original fee motion by 34 percent.  As Plaintiff’s note, 
and as a brief review of Defendants’ invoices confirms, Defendants incurred approximately 
$47,811.50 in fees briefing the November 2018 motion for attorney’s fees.19  ECF No. 63 at 56. 
A reduction of 34 percent would mean reducing the fees incurred briefing the November 2018 
motion for attorney’s fees by $16,255.91.  
Defendants also request leave to supplement the instant motion with the hours spent 
drafting the renewed October 2020 fee motion currently before the Court.  ECF No. 62-1 at 50–
51. Plaintiff responds by asking the Court to preemptively disallow Defendants from filing 
additional requests for fees incurred drafting the renewed motion because it would be akin to 
double recovery given the significant overlap between the two motions.  ECF No. 63 at 56.  The 
undersigned does not—and cannot—determine at this time whether Defendants are entitled to 
additional fees incurred in drafting the renewed fee motion.20  That dispute will be properly before 
the Court should the parties fail to settle any remaining fee disputes and Defendants decide to file 
a third fee motion seeking fees for hours expended on the instant motion.  At that time, Plaintiff is 
free to make any arguments it believes justifies a denial of that request, including that the fee 
sought is unreasonable in light of the award granted here and the fact that the November 2018 fee 
motion and the October 2020 fee motion are virtually identical, except for the new argument made 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 in the instant motion, which was not successful.  Compare ECF No. 48-1, 
with ECF No. 62-1.  Only after those issues have been briefed by the parties will they be ripe for 
19 Defendants do not take issue with the $47,811.50 estimate provided by Plaintiff and the undersigned finds, based 
on a rough calculation of Defendants’ invoice entries that mention the original fee motion, that $47,811.50 is a 
reasonable estimate. 
20 The parties are encouraged to settle any remaining disputes regarding fees, using the Court’s decision on 
Defendants’ present motion for fees as a guide. 
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consideration by the Court.  To make that potential, future decision simpler, the undersigned will 
separately calculate the fees awarded to Defendants for their successful defense against the 
Copyright Act and Lanham Act claims in this case and the fees awarded to Defendants for the 
successful parts of their November 2018 fee motion. 
E. Costs   
 Defendants seek $358.02 in costs.  ECF No. 62-2 at 2.  Those costs were incurred during 
the period that the district court’s judgment was on appeal and include printing, mailing, and 
delivering briefs to the D.C. Circuit and to Plaintiff.  ECF No. 62-12 at 34–35.  Because Defendants 
incurred those costs on appeal, recovery of the costs is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 39.  Rule 39(d) states that “[a] party who wants costs taxed must—within 14 days after 
entry of judgment—file with the circuit clerk and serve an itemized and verified bill of costs.”  
Fed. R. App. P. 39(d); Nat’l Sec. Couns. v. CIA, 189 F. Supp. 3d 73, 84 (D.D.C. 2016) (explaining 
that “[g]enerally, the prevailing party on appeal is entitled to costs taxed by the Circuit under [Rule 
39]” and “[the] party who seeks [appellate] costs is required to file a request to the Circuit Clerk’s 
office within 14 days after a judgment”).  Although Rule 39(e) authorizes certain appellate costs 
to be taxed by the district court, none include the printing, mailing, or delivery costs that 
Defendants seek to recover.  See Fed. R. App. P. 39(e) (“[C]osts on appeal [ ] taxable in the 
[d]istrict [c]ourt” include “(1) the preparation and transmission of the record; (2) the reporter’s 
transcript, if needed to determine the appeal; (3) premiums paid for a bond of other security to 
preserve rights pending appeal; and (4) the fee for filing the notice of appeal.”).  Accordingly, 
Defendants should have filed their request for printing, mailing, and delivery costs in the Court of 
Appeals pursuant to subsection (d) and the undersigned recommends denying Defendants’ request 
for costs.  See Nat’l Sec. Couns., 189 F. Supp. 3d at 84 (denying recovery of the cost of binding 
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the joint appendix because the request was filed “in district court when it should have [been] filed 
[ ] in the Circuit [court]” pursuant to Rule 39(d)); Flythe v. District of Columbia, 317 F.R.D. 596, 
599–600 (D.D.C. 2016) (denying recovery of appellate copying costs because “a party’s copying 
costs are not listed in Rule 39(e) among the categories of costs incurred on appeal that are ‘taxable 
in the district court’” (quoting Fed. R. App. P. 39(e))).   
F. Calculation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends an award to Defendants of 
$201,670.66 in attorney’s fees (which includes $31,555.59 for fees incurred briefing the November 
2018 motion for fees), as reflected in the following charts: 
Fees Awarded for Defendants’ Successful Defense against Plaintiff’s Copyright Act and 
Lanham Act Claims 
Total Fees Sought 
(excluding fees for November 2018 motion for 
attorney’s fees) 
$414,830.00 
Fees Excluded  





Fees Withdrawn by Defendants $15,757.37 
Subtotal after subtracting 
Excluded/Withdrawn Fees 
$340,230.13 
50% Reduction  
(to limit fees to those incurred defending 
against Copyright Act and Lanham Act claims) 
$170,115.07 
Compensation (with Additional 50% 
Reduction) 
$170,115.07 
Fees Awarded for Defendants’ November 2018 Motion for Attorney’s Fees 
Total Fees Incurred $47,811.50 
34% Reduction 
(to limit fees to those awarded pursuant to the 
Copyright Act and Lanham Act, but not Rule 
11) 
$16,255.91 
Compensation (with 34% Reduction) $31,555.59 
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III. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS Defendants be AWARDED 
$201,670.66 in attorney’s fees (which includes $31,555.59 for fees incurred briefing the November 
2018 motion for fees).  The undersigned further RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ request for 
costs incurred on appeal and request to impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 be DENIED. 
* * * * * 
The parties are hereby advised that under the provisions of Local Rule 72.3(b) of the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia, any party who objects to the Report and 
Recommendation must file a written objection thereto with the Clerk of this Court within 14 days 
of the party’s receipt of this Report and Recommendation.  The written objections must specifically 
identify the portion of the report and/or recommendation to which objection is made, and the basis 
for such objections.  The parties are further advised that failure to file timely objections to the 
findings and recommendations set forth in this report may waive their right of appeal from an order 
of the District Court that adopts such findings and recommendation.  See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 
140 (1985).           
Date:  June 8, 2021 __________________________________ 
G. MICHAEL HARVEY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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